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ABSTRACT 
African Americans face a significant and menacing threat, but it is 
not the one that has preoccupied the press, pundits, and policy makers 
in the wake of several bigoted murders and a resurgent white 
supremacist movement.  While hate crimes and hate groups demand 
continued vigilance, if we are truly to protect our minority citizens, 
we must shift our most urgent attention from neo-Nazis stockpiling 
weapons to the seemingly benign gun owners among us—our friends, 
family, and neighbors—who show no animus toward African 
Americans and who profess genuine commitments to equality. 
Our commonsense narratives about racism and guns—centered on 
a conception of humans as autonomous, self-transparent, rational 
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actors—are outdated and strongly contradicted by recent evidence 
from the mind sciences. 
Advances in implicit social cognition reveal that most people carry 
biases against racial minorities beyond their conscious awareness.  
These biases affect critical behavior, including the actions of 
individuals performing shooting tasks.  In simulations, Americans are 
faster and more accurate when firing on armed blacks than when 
firing on armed whites, and faster and more accurate in electing to 
hold their fire when confronting unarmed whites than when 
confronting unarmed blacks.  Yet, studies suggest that people who 
carry implicit racial bias may be able to counteract its effects through 
training. 
Given recent expansions in gun rights and gun ownership—and the 
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of private citizens who already 
use firearms in self-defense each year—this is reason for serious 
concern.  While police officers often receive substantial simulation 
training in the use of weapons that, in laboratory experiments, appears 
to help them control for implicit bias, members of the public who 
purchase guns are under no similar practice duties. 
In addressing this grave danger, states and local governments 
should require ongoing training courses for all gun owners similar to 
other existing licensing regimes.  Such an approach is unlikely to run 
into constitutional problems and is more politically tenable than 
alternative solutions. 
 
Even with the murders that have already occurred, Americans are 
not paying enough attention to the frightening connection between 
the right-wing hate-mongers who continue to slither among us and 
the gun crazies who believe a well-aimed bullet is the ticket to all 
their dreams.1 
  – Bob Herbert 
INTRODUCTION 
A.  Racism, Guns, and Fear 
here is a dangerous link between biases against racial minorities 
and the fight for gun rights.  Journalists, academics, public 
advocates, and government policy makers have identified the first part 
of that connection: right-wing hate groups in the United States 
 
1 Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., A Threat We Can’t Ignore, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/opinion/20herbert.html. 
T
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frequently assert the necessity of an armed citizenry as a bulwark 
against government tyranny and are provoked by the perceived threat 
of firearm restrictions. 
As a report issued in April 2009 by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security warned, the fear of gun regulations and bans is 
linked to increases in recruitment by right-wing extremist 
organizations (particularly white supremacist groups and militias) and 
to spurring the planning and implementation of violence.2  The Anti-
Defamation League offered a similar articulation of the threat to 
racial, ethnic, and religious groups in a recent amicus brief filed in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago.3  Arguing that applying the Second 
Amendment to the states would imperil minorities, the brief noted 
that 
[e]xtremist[s] . . . tend to share several characteristics: an obsessive 
fascination with firearms; a paranoiac distrust of the government or 
a deep-seated hatred for particular minority groups—or both; and a 
willingness to engage in acts of shocking, often deadly, violence.  
Armed extremism leads to violent extremism with profoundly 
unsettling frequency and profoundly tragic effects.4 
James W. von Brunn stands as a paradigmatic example.  On June 
10, 2009, von Brunn, an eighty-eight-year-old white supremacist, 
walked into the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and began 
shooting, killing African American security guard Stephen Tyrone 
Johns.5  Von Brunn’s hatred of blacks and Jews was matched by his 
paranoia concerning an intrusive government; inside the car he 
double-parked outside the museum, von Brunn left a note: “You want 
my weapons—this is how you’ll get them.”6 
 
2 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT 3, 5 
(2009). 
3 Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League at 5, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). 
4 Id. 
5 Theo Emery & Liz Robbins, In Note, More Clues to Holocaust Museum Killing, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/us/12shoot.html. 
6 Id.  Prior to the incident, the FBI was well aware that von Brunn had an “established 
Web site that expressed hatred of African-Americans and Jews.”  Id. (quoting assistant 
FBI director for the District of Columbia, Joseph Persichini Jr.).  Von Brunn believed that 
Jews, blacks, and other minorities were involved in several conspiracies and ran the court 
system that had victimized him after he attempted, in December 1981, to take members of 
the Federal Reserve Board hostage by walking into their Washington headquarters with a 
bag containing a sawed-off shotgun, revolver, and hunting knife.  See David Stout, 
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To many, the murder brought to mind a similar incident involving 
another white supremacist two months earlier, in which Richard 
Poplawski, purportedly motivated by his belief in a Zionist conspiracy 
and President Barack Obama’s imminent ban on firearm ownership, 
killed three Pittsburgh police officers and wounded a fourth.7  His 
contributions to racist Web sites and interviews with his friends 
revealed a man whose growing obsession with firearms tied directly 
into an apocalyptic vision of economic and social collapse fueling the 
rebirth of a great white nation.8 
Many commentators and analysts have suggested that these 
incidents and others like them are a wake-up call that bigotry is alive 
and well in the United States.9  In Bob Herbert’s words, “[I]t’s the 
same old filthy racism that has been there all along . . . .”10 
This hate, simmering in anti-immigrant rhetoric for years, has been 
brought to the surface by the election of the nation’s first black 
President, and, according to some, it is made particularly dangerous 
by those who stir up racial rancor, stoke fears of gun restrictions, and 
imply that violence (and the threat of violence) is an acceptable way 
to resolve problems.11  The Department of Homeland Security, for 
example, has suggested that radical white supremacist groups are 
 
Museum Gunman a Longtime Foe of Government, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/11shoot.html. 
7 See Liz Robbins & Sean D. Hamill, Gunman Kills 3 Police Officers in Pittsburgh, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/us/05pittsburgh.html; 
Sean D. Hamill, Man Accused in Pittsburgh Killings Voiced Racist Views Online, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/us/07pittsburgh.html. 
8 See Rich Lord & Paula Reed Ward, A Portrait of Contrasts Emerges from Those Who 
Knew Poplawski, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 12, 2009; Hamill, supra note 7. 
9 See, e.g., Press Release, Simon Wiesenthal Center, SWC Reaction to Shooting of 
Security Guard at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum By Self-Identified Anti-Semite, 
White Supremacist, and Hater of African-Americans (2010) (“[T]he attack . . . shows that 
the cancer of hatred, bigotry and anti-Semitism is alive and well in America.”); Bob 
Herbert, Op-Ed., The Way We Are, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2009/06/13/opinion/13herbert.html (“The bullet that killed [security guard Stephen 
Tyrone Johns] was a reminder of the continuing menace of bigotry and violence that 
pervades this country—and that we insist on underestimating.”). 
10 Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., The Scourge Persists, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/19/opinion/19herbert.html. 
11 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Big Hate, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/opinion/12krugman.html; Frank Rich, Op-Ed., The 
Obama Haters’ Silent Enablers, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2009/06/14/opinion/14rich.html; Judith Warner, The Wages of Hate, Opinionator, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2009, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/the-wages-of        
-hate; DeWayne Wickham, White Racism’s Convenient Target: Our President, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 18, 2009. 
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likely to continue to use both Barack Obama’s election and the debate 
over gun-control legislation prompted by the Supreme Court’s 2008 
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller12 as powerful tools “to 
recruit new members, mobilize existing supporters, and broaden their 
scope and appeal through propaganda.”13 
Focusing on more mainstream individuals and groups, Herbert has 
written of “an increasingly unrestrained manifestation of racism 
directed toward Mr. Obama that is being fed by hate-mongers on talk 
radio and is widely tolerated, if not encouraged, by Republican Party 
leaders.”14  Fellow New York Times columnist Judith Warner has 
pointed to racist jokes and cartoons appearing on Facebook pages and 
in the mass e-mails of major Republican activists and state senate 
aides, as well as to bigotry on posters at conservative protests.15  
According to some writers and pundits, politicians and media 
personalities have not only been active in bolstering and legitimizing 
racist sentiments but have also made existing bigotry far more 
dangerous by playing up the extreme threat posed by the Obama 
government and casting it as the type of threat that can only be 
addressed with violence.16  As conservative commentator David Frum 
has warned, 
 The Nazi comparisons from Rush Limbaugh; broadcaster Mark 
Levin asserting that President Obama is “literally at war with the 
American people”; former vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin 
claiming that the president was planning “death panels” to extirpate 
the aged and disabled; the charges that the president is a fascist, a 
socialist, a Marxist, an illegitimate Kenyan fraud, that he “harbors a 
deep resentment of America,” that he feels a “deep-seated hatred of 
white people,” that his government is preparing concentration 
camps, that it is operating snitch lines, that it is planning to wipe 
away American liberties”: All this hysterical and provocative talk 
invites, incites, and prepares a prefabricated justification for 
violence.17 
 
12 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
13 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 2, at 2. 
14 Herbert, supra note 10; see also Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Black in the Age of 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/05/opinion/05blow 
.html (“We are now inundated with examples of overt racism on a scale to which we are 
unaccustomed.”). 
15 Warner, supra note 11. 
16 Joan Walsh, Can Right-Wing Hate Talk Lead to Murder?, SALON (June 10, 2009), 
http://www.salon.com/opinion/walsh/politics/2009/06/10/von_brunn/. 
17 David Frum, The Reckless Right Courts Violence, WEEK, Aug. 12, 2009, 
http://www.theweek.com/bullpen/column/99474/The_reckless_Right_courts_violence. 
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Frank Rich has provided a similar assessment, writing of “the 
simmering undertone of violence in our politics” and pointing to 
Sarah Palin’s failure to condemn people at her rallies who yelled 
“Treason!,” “Terrorist!,” and “Off with his head!” against Obama, 
and to Senator Tom “Coburn’s implicit rationalization for far-right 
fanatics bearing arms at presidential events.”18  As Herbert has added, 
“As if [racist extremists like von Brunn and Poplawski] weren’t 
dangerous enough to begin with, the fuel to further inflame them is 
available in the over-the-top rhetoric of the National Rifle 
Association, which has relentlessly pounded the bogus theme that 
Barack Obama is planning to take away people’s guns.”19 
All of this has led to a set of conclusions on how best to address the 
concern.  While some have continued to push for tighter gun 
restrictions,20 much of the popular discussion among journalists and 
academics—and much of the response by the government—has been 
on cracking down on overt bigots and those who provoke them into 
action.21  Columnist Charles M. Blow, for example, has advocated 
keeping a more watchful eye out for the bad apples in our midst and 
intervening before violence takes place.22  Prompted by an increase in 
hate speech and surging gun sales, the federal government has 
launched the “Lone Wolf Initiative” to track potential attackers like 
von Brunn.23  Other commentators have argued for a stronger 
prosecutorial response, and, with new appointments in the Civil 
Rights Division, the Justice Department has increased its load of 
 
18 Frank Rich, Op-Ed., The Guns of August, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/23/opinion/23rich.html. 
19 Herbert, supra note 1.  The NRA Web site “GunBaNObam.com” warns, “Obama 
Would Be the Most Anti-Gun President in American History” and “Hillary Was Right: 
You Can’t Trust Obama With Your Guns.”  GUNBANOBAMA, http://www.gunbanobama 
.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
20 See, e.g., S.A. Miller, Gun Controllers Say Rampage Aids Cause, WASH. TIMES, June 
11, 2009; Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League, supra note 3, at 5–6 (arguing 
that the threat of extremism counsels against incorporation of the Second Amendment and 
urging the Supreme Court to decide the case narrowly so as not to endanger existing state 
and local gun controls). 
21 See, e.g., Herbert, supra note 10; Frum, supra note 17. 
22 See, e.g., Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Hate in a Cocoon of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, June 
12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/opinion/13blow.html; Eric Hickey, 
Infiltrate and Monitor Hate Groups, Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/hate-crimes-and-extremist-politics/ 
(arguing for “infiltrating and monitoring” hate groups). 
23 Kevin Johnson, Feds Try to Detect “Lone Offenders,” USA TODAY, Aug. 12, 2009. 
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federal hate crime cases to the highest level since 2001.24  Still other 
writers and pundits have debated whether hateful content on the 
Internet—including supremacist Web sites, Facebook pages, and 
YouTube videos—ought to be regulated.25  And there have even been 
suggestions that politicians and members of the media should be held 
accountable (although not necessarily in the legal sense) for attacks 
by their followers.26 
B.  Another Connection Story 
While drawing attention to the threat of racism and its connection 
to certain antigovernment gun advocacy is merited, there is another 
aspect to the relationship between biases against minorities and the 
Second Amendment that is both far more subtle and potentially far 
more destructive.  Columnists and scholars are not writing or talking 
about this other story, but it stands as a menace all the same, 
endangering the lives of people of color on a scale that greatly 
exceeds the threat of the von Brunns and Poplawskis in our midst. 
To understand this dynamic, it is vital to consider how discussions 
of and responses to prejudice and gun rights—including those 
outlined above—have been informed by a powerful conception of the 
autonomous, self-transparent, rational actor.  Although this 
conception of human agency is dominant within the legal sphere and 
without, the best evidence from social psychology, social cognition, 
and related fields strongly challenges its realism.27  Taking this 
 
24 See Ian Urbina, Federal Hate Crime Cases at Highest Level Since ’01, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/us/18hate.html; see also Carrie 
Johnson, Justice Official Vows Action on Hate Crimes, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2009, at A6. 
25 See, e.g., Hate Crimes and Extremist Politics, Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 
11, 2009, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/hate-crimes-and-extremist  
-politics/; Press Release, Simon Wiesenthal Center, Facebook, YouTube +: How Social 
media Outlets Impact Digital Terrorism and Hate (May 13, 2009). 
26 See, e.g., Warner, supra note 11; Herbert, supra note 1; Rich, supra note 18; Rich, 
supra note 11. 
27 This Article adopts a critical realist (or law and mind sciences) approach, which 
relies on the insights of the mind sciences to construct a more realistic model of human 
behavior upon which to base law and legal theory.  For other representative work in the 
critical realist project, see Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in 
America, 53 EMORY L.J. 311 (2004); Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We 
Overlook, 85 INDIANA L.J. 1333 (2010); Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great 
Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 
57 EMORY L.J. 311 (2008); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The 
Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 
(2004); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of 
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004); Jon Hanson & David 
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behavioral research seriously casts doubt on the theoretical 
foundations of current approaches to regulating firearms and to 
protecting our racial minority citizens: rational shooters and conscious 
racists.  If we are to achieve our goal of ensuring the safety of African 
Americans and other minorities, we cannot afford to ignore the 
evidence anymore; the law must react to the truth about what actually 
underlies human behavior. 
Part I of this Article begins with a brief overview of the current 
landscape concerning the Second Amendment and race-based 
violence.  The discussion offers compelling evidence that we are in a 
moment in which firearm possession and use by private citizens is 
increasingly accepted and embraced by government actors and the 
public at large.  The analysis also suggests that while there is some 
evidence of a rise in hate groups and racially motivated hate crimes in 
recent months and years, the outward prejudice that was once 
commonplace in the United States has actually decreased significantly 
over the last several decades and has grown to be viewed as 
unacceptable and immoral.  Nonetheless, racial minorities—
specifically African Americans—continue to inhabit notably 
disadvantaged positions compared to whites in the contexts of health, 
employment, housing, education, and criminal justice. 
This section serves as a backdrop for an investigation into the 
dominant narratives of prejudice and firearm rights mentioned above, 
by which both racial bias and gun deaths are understood to result from 
bad choices, poor self-control, and rotten dispositions.  These 
narratives are reflected in popular culture, propel key policy debates, 
and inform our laws. 
Part II then explores recent scientific research on implicit racial 
bias that undermines conceptions of human behavior as rational and 
consciously willed.  Today, the major threat to African Americans is 
not, as Herbert has argued, “the same old filthy racism that has been 
there all along.”28  Despite the large amount of attention that bigoted 
murders garner, in reality, incidents like those perpetrated by von 
Brunn and Poplawski are rare.  The far more pressing peril for blacks 
stems from an unconscious set of racial associations—held by the 
 
Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, 
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) [hereinafter Hanson 
& Yosifon, The Situation]; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A 
Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter 
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character]. 
28 Herbert, supra note 10. 
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majority of Americans—that drive discriminatory and potentially life-
threatening actions largely beyond people’s awareness. 
Most pertinent to this Article, in several important experiments 
involving firearm simulations in which participants were required to 
shoot people carrying weapons and hold their fire with respect to 
unarmed individuals, subjects who demonstrated little or no explicit 
prejudice nonetheless acted in a racially biased manner: they did not 
do the rational thing and shoot all of the threatening individuals with 
guns and spare all of the innocents; they disproportionately and 
erroneously shot unarmed blacks and held their fire when they saw 
armed whites.  Other research has shown, however, that particular 
shooter training may allow people who carry implicit racial bias to 
avoid its effects. 
This leads to a troubling set of implications, detailed in Part III: 
although police officers in a number of jurisdictions receive 
significant decisional shooting practice, which appears to aid in 
controlling for implicit bias, as this Article documents in a state-by-
state survey included in Appendix A, most members of the public 
who buy guns are not similarly compelled to undergo meaningful 
firearm training.  In a nation with expanding public gun culture and 
decreasing government regulation—where criminal enforcement may 
be shifting from the professional police force to everyday citizens 
protecting their homes and families—the danger is greatly magnified.  
People who carry implicit bias against racial minorities, but who lack 
the training to counteract their bias when it comes to behavior, stand 
as a grave threat to racial minorities. 
Part IV of the Article concludes with a policy proposal for state 
and local governments to address the developments and dynamics 
discussed in the previous sections.  This Part offers a warning that if 
we continue to focus our attention on the menace of paranoid white 
supremacists enflamed by gun regulation fear mongering, we will not 
only ignore a far more potent danger to our citizenry but may also be 
prompted to pursue courses of action that imperil important basic 
rights, like freedoms of speech and association.  The least invasive, 
most effective, and most politically realistic approach to eliminating 
the danger of racially biased gun use is for states to require ongoing 
firearm-simulation training and shooting practice designed to improve 
accuracy by disrupting the influence of automatic stereotypes. 
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I 
RACISM AND GUN RIGHTS 
A.  A Changing Landscape 
As discussed previously, one of the purported motivating factors 
for those perpetrating hate crimes or joining hate groups is 
apprehension over gun regulations.  In the words of the Department of 
Homeland Security, the “[p]roposed imposition of firearms 
restrictions and weapons bans [is] likely [to] . . . attract new members 
into the ranks of rightwing extremist groups, as well as potentially 
spur some of them to begin planning and training for violence.”29 
This naturally leads to questions as to the current state of firearms 
regulations in the United States.  Are additional restrictions being 
proposed by legislatures?  Are new bans likely to be upheld by 
courts?  Are members of the public supportive of more gun controls? 
The following pages take up those issues and describe an 
environment in which gun advocates have enjoyed remarkable 
success.  In particular, the focus is on (1) the recently articulated 
individual rights approach to the Second Amendment, (2) a thriving 
American gun culture, (3) ever-expanding gun ownership, and (4) the 
significant use of firearms by citizens in self-defense. 
Thus, although the 2008 election stoked fears of a new restrictive 
governmental approach to guns, and President Obama continues to be 
assailed as a major threat to Second Amendment rights, the United 
States is experiencing a period of growing acceptance of guns in all 
aspects of life.  Indeed, we are increasingly witnessing a shift from 
public criminal law enforcement by police forces to private-citizen 
enforcement. 
The shift may be traced, in part, to the pervasiveness of a shared 
narrative—discussed in Part I.B—that most adult Americans, as 
rational actors, are in complete, conscious control of their shooting 
decisions and that bad shooting outcomes stem from the evil 
dispositions and poor choices of a small minority.  This narrative is 
challenged by the psychological evidence presented in Part II on the 
implicit (unconscious) cognitive processes that influence gun use, 
which leads to the conclusion that the broad expansion of gun rights 
and culture and the shift to private-citizen enforcement, documented 
in the pages that follow, present an acute danger. 
 
29 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 2, at 3. 
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1.  Guns 
a.  A New View of the Second Amendment 
Until 2007, no federal court had ever overturned a gun ownership 
restriction as violating the Second Amendment.30  “[T]he right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms”31 was understood as a collective right: 
the purpose of the Second Amendment was to limit Congress’s ability 
to assert too much power over the several states by protecting the 
well-regulated militia as a potential bulwark against the national 
army.32  Indeed, prior to the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, there were only three instances in which the Supreme Court 
addressed the Second Amendment, and each time the Court construed 
the amendment as protecting a collective right as opposed to an 
individual right.33  This interpretation was broadly accepted for nearly 
a century, and no legal articles promoting the individual interpretation 
appeared until 1960.34 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, however, the Supreme Court 
upheld the D.C. Circuit’s invalidation of sections of Washington’s 
firearm restrictions, announcing that under the Second Amendment 
people have an individual right to bear arms.35  Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, grounded his originalist analysis of the amendment 
in the primary “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms 
in defense of hearth and home.”36 
Having not considered the constitutionality of existing municipal 
and state firearms regulations in Heller, the Supreme Court took up 
the issue in McDonald v. City of Chicago, with the majority 
incorporating the Second Amendment right articulated in Heller 
 
30 See Cass Sunstein, America’s 21st-Century Gun Right, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 
2008; Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
32 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
33 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 
(1886); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
34 See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A 
Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 4–5 (2000) (referencing Stuart R. Hays, The Right to 
Bear Arms, a Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381 (1960)). 
35 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797. 
36 Id. at 2821; see also id. at 2817 (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central 
to the Second Amendment right.”). 
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against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.37  However, 
the Court did not offer much further clarification on the particular 
types of firearms regulations that are now potentially 
unconstitutional—aside from complete bans on the use of handguns 
in the home for self-defense—or the standard of review for assessing 
such regulations.38 
In Heller, the majority made clear that the right to bear arms is not 
a license “to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner 
whatsoever and for whatever purpose” and that governmental entities 
retain some ability to regulate arms39—a position that it reiterated in 
McDonald.40  However, in just the first eighteen months following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, there were over 190 
challenges to firearms laws and prosecutions based on the Second 
Amendment.41  These included challenges to laws banning 
individuals who had been indicted from possessing firearms,42 
prohibiting carrying loaded guns in public,43 and banning the sale of 
particularly dangerous weapons,44 among other things.  The 
landscape is still in flux, but whatever further clarification the 
Supreme Court offers on the remaining authority of states and 
 
37 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).  Although McDonald 
was a 5-to-4 decision, the outcome was expected by legal scholars.  See, e.g., Bret Boyce, 
Heller, McDonald and Originalism, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 2; see also Adam 
Liptak, Justices Will Weigh Challenges to Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/us/01scotus.html (“Most legal scholars expect the 
court to apply the Second Amendment to the states.”); Nelson Lund, Anticipating Second 
Amendment Incorporation: The Role of the Inferior Courts, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 185, 
199 (2008). 
38 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3044.  The concurring opinion in United States v. 
McCane summarized the challenge thusly: “Knowing the meaning of the Second 
Amendment right and having identified its individual nature, the issue becomes what 
limits the government may place on the right.  Indeed, this is where the Second 
Amendment rubber meets the road.”  No. 08-6235, slip. op. at 4 (10th Cir. July 28, 2009) 
(Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
39 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008). 
40 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (“Despite municipal respondents’ doomsday 
proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”). 
41 Brief of Amici Curiae Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, The International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, The International Brotherhood of Police Officers, and The 
National Black Police Association in Support of Neither Party at 3, McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Brady 
Center]. 
42 See, e.g., United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
43 See, e.g., Palmer v. District of Columbia, No. 09-cv-1482 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 6, 
2009). 
44 See, e.g., Peña v. Cid, No. 2:09-cv-01185 (E.D. Cal. filed Apr. 30, 2009). 
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localities to regulate firearm possession in the wake of Heller and 
McDonald, individual gun rights seem likely to continue to expand. 
b.  A Thriving Gun Culture 
Gun culture is flourishing in the United States.  Nowhere is that 
more clear than in the significant shift toward (re)incorporating guns 
into everyday life.45  The Supreme Court’s opinions in Heller and 
McDonald have prompted state and local governments to reconsider 
their existing firearm regulations, but other changes have emerged as 
a result of small-scale lobbying by gun rights advocates and general 
shifts in public attitudes.46  While twenty years ago only six states had 
right-to-carry laws, today over forty states have such provisions.47  
Firearms are finding their way into spaces that for decades—and, in 
some cases, much longer—were off limits.  Sanctuaries have become 
gun-friendly zones.  Twenty states now allow firearms in churches, 
and a number have recently cut back on other place restrictions.48  
Indiana passed legislation in January 2010 that now bars private 
employers from preventing employees from having guns in their 
automobiles on company property.49  In Arizona, the Governor 
recently signed a bill allowing people to carry concealed guns into 
establishments that serve alcohol, making the state the forty-first with 
such a provision.50 
On the national level, an amendment to the annual defense 
authorization bill allowing a gun owner who is issued a permit in one 
state to carry a concealed weapon into another state without holding a 
separate permit was defeated by just two votes in the Senate in July 
2009.51  This defeat proved a rare setback in a year with several major 
victories for firearm enthusiasts.  President Obama, for example, 
recently signed legislation allowing people to bring firearms into 
 
45 See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Pastor Urges His Flock to Bring Guns to Church, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/us/26guns.html. 
46 See Ian Urbina, Fearing Obama Agenda, States Push to Loosen Gun Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/us/24guns.html. 
47 Press Release, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action, Bi-Partisan 
Congressional Majority Moves to Restore Second Amendment in National Parks (May 20, 
2009). 
48 Seelye, supra note 44. 
49 See Urbina, supra note 45. 
50 Amanda Lee Myers, Guns Allowed in Arizona Bars Starting Wednesday, ABC NEWS 
(Sept. 29, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=8702911. 
51 See Bernie Becker & David M. Herszenhorn, Gun Rights Expansion Fails in Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/politics/23guns.html. 
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national parks52 and permitting passengers to carry firearms on 
Amtrak.53  Advocates in Congress have more permissive firearm 
legislation on tap for the future.54  And a number of members of the 
Senate and the House have even defended bringing guns to public 
forums, like the town hall meetings on health care reform that 
President Obama conducted last year.55 
One exception to the general expansion of gun tolerance in the 
United States, which analysis in Part II.B helps to explain, is that 
firearm restrictions at schools continue to be fairly strict.56  Guns are 
currently prohibited at schools in thirty-eight states and in the District 
of Columbia,57 and proposed legislation to permit students to carry 
firearms at colleges has been derailed in the twenty or so states in 
which it has been introduced over the last three years.58  Yet, despite 
the general resistance to allowing firearms in schools, it is a testament 
to the growing strength of American gun culture that, after recent 
mass shooting tragedies at Virginia Tech and elsewhere, many 
 
52 Obama Signs New Rules for Credit Cards into Law, MSNBC (May 22, 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30884011/.  Although public hunting is impermissible 
under the national parks’ founding legislation, there have also been recent attempts to 
remove the prohibition.  See Elk Hunting in the Badlands, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/08/opinion/08wed4.html.  In 2009, for instance, Senator 
Byron Dorgan introduced a rider to an appropriations bill for the Department of Interior in 
which he provided for a “common sense” public hunt in Theodore Roosevelt National 
Park in North Dakota.  Id. 
53 See Chad Pergram, President Signs Bill That Allows Gun-Slinging AMTRAK 
Passengers to Be Locked in Boxes, The Speaker’s Lobby, FOX NEWS.COM (Dec. 16, 
2009), http://congress.blogs.foxnews.com/2009/12/16/president-signs-bill-that-allows-gun 
-slinging-amtrak-passengers-to-be-locked-in-boxes/ (noting a clerical error in the 
legislation). 
54 See Becker & Herszenhorn, supra note 51 (“[John] Thune, [Republican of South 
Dakota] Senator Tom Coburn, Republican of Oklahoma, and other pro-gun lawmakers had 
said they intended to bring many provisions seeking to expand gun rights to the Senate 
floor this year.”). 
55 See Jim Galloway, Gingrey on Guns at Health Care Debates: “I Have No Fear,” 
Political Insider, AJC.COM (Aug. 17, 2009), http://blogs.ajc.com/political-insider-jim         
-galloway/2009/08/17/phil-gingrey-on-guns-at-health-care-debates/ (quoting 
Representative Phil Gingrey); “Meet the Press” Transcript for August 16, 2009, MSNBC 
(Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32420049/ns/meet_the_press/ (quoting 
Senator Tom Coburn). 
56 See infra text, accompanying notes 64–69. 
57 Marisol Bello, Push to Permit Guns on Campus, USA TODAY, Feb. 15, 2008. 
58 See Urbina, supra note 46. 
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individuals have argued publicly that the incidents reveal the need for 
more armed citizens in the public sphere, not fewer.59 
On the whole, despite many warnings by the National Rifle 
Association and other groups about pending gun regulation if John 
McCain were to lose the 2008 presidential election,60 President 
Obama has done little to crack down on gun ownership since taking 
office.61  The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence characterized 
Obama’s first-year record on gun control as an “abject failure,” 
pointing to his unwillingness to strengthen background checks, ban 
assault weapons, and oppose concealed carry.62 
Part of the reason for President Obama’s hesitance may have to do 
with changing public perceptions on gun ownership.  The NRA has 
experienced a thirty percent increase in its membership rolls since 
Obama was elected in November 2008.63  In fact, the Pew Research 
Center’s most recent data on public opinions of gun ownership show 
that a record high percentage of Americans believe that it is more 
important to protect gun owners’ rights than it is to control gun 
ownership.64  The support for each side is near equal with forty-five 
percent of respondents choosing gun owners’ rights and forty-nine 
percent favoring control of gun ownership.65  These data suggest a 
sharp change in public opinion from the previous year in which fifty-
eight percent of respondents said gun control was more important 
than the rights of gun owners, and only thirty-seven percent of 
respondents reported the opposite view.66 
For many, gun rights are not only valued but also seem to elicit a 
rarefied fervor that is unique among the various constitutional 
protections.  Ken Pagano, pastor of the New Bethel Church in 
Louisville, Kentucky, for example, recently invited churchgoers to 
bring their weapons to services to “celebrate our rights as 
 
59 See, e.g., John Lott & Maxim Lott, More Guns, Not Less, Would Prevent Shooting 
Massacres, FOX NEWS.COM (Aug. 29, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933 
,294954,00.html. 
60 See, e.g., GUNBANOBAMA, supra note 19. 
61 See Herbert, supra note 1; Urbina, supra note 46. 
62 BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, PRESIDENT OBAMA’S FIRST YEAR: 
FAILED LEADERSHIP, LOST LIVES 1–2 (2010). 
63 Seelye, supra note 45. 
64 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICANS NOW DIVIDED OVER BOTH ISSUES: PUBLIC 
TAKES CONSERVATIVE TURN ON GUN CONTROL, ABORTION (2009). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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Americans!”67  Following an opinion by the Wisconsin Attorney 
General that “citizens who openly carry firearms should not be cited 
for disorderly conduct,” over two hundred people, half of them 
armed, celebrated with a picnic at a public park in La Crosse County, 
Wisconsin.68  Other open-carry picnics, parades, parties, and rallies 
have occurred across the country.69 
The transformation in public perceptions, however, goes beyond 
popular feelings about owning or carrying firearms.  There also 
appears to be a shift in Americans’ opinions about the use of guns. 
As a result, more and more states have been implementing laws 
that expand the set of circumstances in which a citizen can 
legitimately use a firearm against a person he perceives to be 
intruding into his home.  In general, these “castle doctrine” laws 
allow an individual to use reasonable force, including deadly force, 
against an attacker and eliminate any duty to retreat to safety.  These 
laws have become increasingly popular in the last five years, with 
over fifteen states adopting some form of the “castle doctrine” since 
2005.70  Although the exact provisions of these statutes vary from 
state to state, some versions remove the duty to retreat altogether, 
whether in the home or outside of it, and may even abandon the 
requirement that a person be in reasonable fear of his life before 
resorting to lethal force.71  Oklahoma’s “Make My Day” statute, for 
instance, eliminates a person’s duty to retreat if “attacked in any . . . 
place where he or she has a right to be” and gives that person the 
“right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including 
deadly force, if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so 
to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another 
or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.”72  The result is that 
an armed citizen can find himself in a situation where he may shoot 
someone to death outside of his home, without any belief that his life 
is in danger, free from criminal liability. 
 
67 Seelye, supra note 45. 
68 Hamburgers, Hot Dogs, Brats and Guns at Picnic, MSNBC (May 14, 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30747452/. 
69 Eartha Jane Melzer, Gun Rights Supporters Pair Weekend Picnic with Weaponry, 
MICH. MESSENGER, June 29, 2009. 
70 Christopher Reinhart, Castle Doctrine and Self-Defense (Jan. 17, 2007), 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-R-0052.htm. 
71 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (2010). 
72 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Overall, while the NRA and other groups have enjoyed great 
success in expanding gun rights on numerous fronts, their strong 
advocacy continues.  In recent years, the NRA has been ranked as the 
most powerful lobbying organization by lawmakers and their staffers, 
and with a current membership of nearly four million, it remains one 
of the most influential voices in Washington.73  In addition to 
sponsoring lawsuits seeking to overturn state and local gun 
regulations and attempts to expand self-defense laws, its current 
legislative agenda includes a campaign to prevent the reinstatement of 
the federal semiautomatic assault weapons ban, which expired in 
2004.74  The NRA has also continued its efforts to alter the gun 
control debate by sponsoring seminars for scholars; providing 
research grants; distributing books and law review articles to libraries, 
public defender services, and others; and conducting student essay 
contests.75  Building support for its positions by shaping knowledge 
production and consumption at all levels, the organization is 
positioned to see further gains for pro-gun culture. 
c.  More Guns, More Gun Ownership, More Gun Permits 
The real story of the NRA revolution has been not only about 
expanding rights and public perceptions about guns but also about 
expanding gun ownership. 
Buying guns has been normalized in the United States; today, 
firearms are just another commodity.  There are five states in which 
you will have better luck finding a gun dealer than a gas station.76  
And if you prefer not to go to a gun store, you can try one of the 
several thousand gun shows held each year.77  Or, better yet, head 
 
73 About Us, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, http://home.nra.org/#/home (last visited Oct. 10, 
2010). 
74 Id. 
75 Research: Special Funds, NRA CIVIL RIGHTS DEF. FUND, 
http://www.nradefensefund.org/research.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  David T. Hardy, 
for example, was provided with a grant of $15,500 for writing a book review in the 
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal and an article in the Thomas Jefferson Law Review.  
Id. 
76 VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINE IN GUN DEALERS: 1994 TO 
2007 6 (2007), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/dealers07.pdf (The states are 
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Wyoming.). 
77 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION AND 
INSPECTIONS DIV., THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES’ 
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS AT GUN SHOWS i (2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e0707/final.pdf. 
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over to Max Motors, a car dealership in Butler, Missouri, where 
owner Mark Muller recently offered a voucher for an AK-47 with 
every truck purchase, after having great success with a similar 
promotion, involving coupons for handguns, the previous year.78  
Travel to Kennesaw, Georgia, and you will find a firearm in every 
single home as a result of a law requiring heads of households to own 
at least one firearm.79  For Kennesaw residents—and many other 
Americans—a gun is just another basic home safety tool, like a smoke 
detector or fire extinguisher.  The best current estimate is that there 
are around 200 to 250 million firearms owned by private individuals 
in the United States.80 
In spite of a severe recession, Americans bought more guns and 
ammunition between October 2008 and October 2009 than they ever 
had before.81  Indeed, during that period, firearms dealers sold twelve 
billion rounds of ammunition, which would give every man, woman, 
and child in the United States thirty-eight bullets each.82  As a result, 
the U.S. Treasury Department reported a forty-two percent increase in 
the taxes collected on gun sales and a forty-nine percent increase on 
sales of ammunition.83 
The upward trend in sales mirrored a surge in new firearm licenses 
and permits.84  From the launch of the National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (NICS) in 1998 until 2005, the total 
number of background checks performed in any given year deviated 
no more than five percent from the previous year.85  However, from 
2006 to 2009, background checks increased each year by double digit 
percentages.86 
 
78 See Richard S. Chang, Car Dealer Offers AK-47 with Purchase, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 
2009, http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/car-dealer-offers-ak-47-with-purchase/. 
79 See Gary Kleck, Crime Control Through the Private Use of Armed Force, 35 SOC. 
PROBS. 15 (1988). 
80 See Philip J. Cook et al., Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a 
Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1045 (2009). 
81 See David A. Fahrenthold & Fredrick Kunkle, U.S. Sees Shortage of Ammunition, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2009. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 Soaring Gun Sales in Arizona: Planning for the Worst, ECONOMIST, June 4, 2009; 
John O’Connor, Illinois Gun Sales Soar, up 39 Percent, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2008. 
85 See National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/nics.htm (last visited Jun. 29, 2010); Total 
NICS Background Checks, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/hq 
/cjisd/nics/nics_checks_total.htm (last visited June 29, 2010); Urbina, supra note 46. 
86 See Total NICS Background Checks, supra note 85. 
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d.  Gun Use: Private Enforcers? 
Legislatures and courts have granted Americans broad new firearm 
rights, and Americans are arming themselves more than ever, but how 
much are private citizens actually using their guns?  The answer 
appears to be quite a lot. 
Although estimates vary, one of the most widely cited studies 
calculated that Americans employ guns to defend themselves 
approximately 2.5 million times per year—or approximately 6850 
times each day.87  In another study, it was found that burglars are 
confronted by armed homeowners approximately half a million times 
each year.88 
In many incidents in which a firearm is brandished, no shot is fired, 
but in many others, triggers are pulled with expected results.  Indeed, 
“[a]n American burglar’s risk of being shot while invading an 
occupied home is greater than his risk of going to prison.”89  Overall, 
estimates suggest that, in the United States, there are over 36,000 
firearm-related deaths and over 82,000 nonfatal firearm-related 
injuries each year.90  Blacks make up fifty-four percent of the victims 
of nonfatal gunshot wounds and fifty-four percent of the victims of 
fatal gunshot wounds.91 
 
87 See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and 
Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 175 (1995) 
(about a quarter of these incidents involve the actual discharge of a weapon); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Kleck and Gertz 
study); see also Brief of the International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers 
Association (ILEETA) at 14, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 
07-290) (“There have been 13 major surveys regarding the frequency of defensive gun use 
(DGU) in the modern United States.  The surveys range from a low of 760,000 annually to 
a high of three million.”); PHILIP COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS OF 
A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 62–63 (1996) 
(estimating an annual figure of 1,460,000); Tom Smith, A Call for a Truce in the DGU 
War, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1462 (1997) (The National Opinion Research Center 
puts the annual figure in the range of 256,500 to 1,210,000.); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, 1992–2005: 
CONCATENATED INCIDENT-LEVEL FILES (2005). 
88 See Robin M. Ikeda et al., Estimating Intruder-Related Firearm Retrievals in U.S. 
Households, 1994, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 363, 367 (1997). 
89 Brief of the International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association 
(ILEETA) at 10, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290). 
90 See MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ & KEVIN J. STROM, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, FIREARM INJURY AND DEATH FROM CRIME, 1993–97 2 (2000), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fidc9397.pdf. 
91 See id. 
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With the Supreme Court and states enlarging the scope of Second 
Amendment rights and an ever-expanding gun culture in the United 
States, it is quite possible that the use of firearms by private 
individuals will significantly increase.  In fact, the coming decades 
may demonstrate an ongoing shift of criminal enforcement from 
police forces to armed citizens.  Already, private citizens shoot and 
kill more than 2.5 times as many criminals as members of the police 
do.92  And much of the argumentation both before the Supreme Court 
and in popular discourse in support of pro-gun positions has been on 
the vital need for every adult citizen to have the means to defend 
himself without having to rely on ineffective state mechanisms at 
critical moments.  As Nelson Lund has explained, the purpose of the 
Second Amendment “is to enable American citizens to defend 
themselves, not against direct oppression by the government, but 
against oppression from which the government fails to protect them.   
. . .  [T]he police do not and cannot protect law-abiding citizens from 
criminal violence.”93 
A number of briefs filed in McDonald made exactly that point, 
asserting that a shift to private citizen enforcement must be made 
because the police (1) are corrupt and brutal,94 (2) are ineffective 
because of staffing shortages and scandals,95 (3) “have no legal or 
constitutional duty to rescue citizens from violence,”96 (4) “despite 
best efforts . . . rarely arrive in time to prevent or interrupt a crime,”97 
and (5) are overwhelmed by great increases in 911 calls.98  As the 
NRA summed up, “Overwhelming evidence shows that [citizen-
owned] firearms, including handguns, are the most effective and safe 
means of deterring burglars and other home invaders.”99  In referring 
to “self-defense” not as a “subsidiary interest,” as Justice Breyer had 
 
92 See GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 111–16, 148 
(1991). 
93 NELSON LUND, A PRIMER ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR 
ARMS 13 (2002). 
94 Brief of Buckeye Firearms Foundation at 25, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. 
Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). 
95 Id. at 15–24. 
96 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Heartland Institute in Support of Petitioners at 3, 10–11, 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). 
97 Id. at 12. 
98 Id. 
99 Reply Brief for Respondents, The National Rifle Association of America, Inc. et al. 
in Support of Petitioners at 23–24, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) 
(No. 08-1521). 
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characterized it,100 but as “the central component of the right [to bear 
arms] itself,”101 the Supreme Court majority in Heller provided the 
legal foundation for just such a shift toward private-citizen 
enforcement. 
2.  Racism and Disparate Outcomes 
At the same time that there have been significant changes in the 
United States concerning opinions, policies, laws, and practices 
relating to firearms, there has also been important shifts on matters of 
race.  In the first half of the last century, prejudice against minorities 
was out in the open—it was on water fountain signs, typed into home 
leases, and peppered in casual conversations.  Today, however, overt 
racism is strongly stigmatized and tends to be roundly condemned 
when it emerges.102  As Antony Page and Michael J. Pitts summarize, 
Sixty years ago white Americans tended to believe that African- 
Americans were their intellectual inferiors.  More recently, only a 
small fraction make this claim.  In 1945, 55% of white respondents 
asserted that whites should be given the first chance at any job as 
opposed to giving “Negroes” as good a chance; by 1972, only 3% 
agreed.  In 1957, a majority of Americans indicated they would not 
cast a ballot for an African-American President, but by 2007 it was 
only 7%.103 
Indeed, with the election of Barack Obama as the first African 
American President in 2008, a common sentiment has emerged that 
we have entered (or are entering) a “post-racial” era.104  As Obama 
explained in his 2004 Democratic National Convention speech, 
“There’s not a black America and white America and Latino America 
and Asian America; there’s the United States of America.”105  Our 
laws have been purged of racial language and now actively bar 
 
100 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2866 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
101 Id. at 2801 (majority opinion). 
102 See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, BLACK PRIDE AND BLACK 
PREJUDICE 6–8 (2002); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect 
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2009); Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009); Antony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, 
Election Law, and the Problem of Implicit Bias 19 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
103 See Page & Pitts, supra note 102, at 19 (citations omitted). 
104 See Cho, supra note 102, at 1591–93. 
105 President Barack Obama, Keynote Address at the 2004 Democratic National 
Convention (July 27, 2004) (transcript available at Obama News and Speeches, BARACK 
OBAMA.COM (July 27, 2004), http://www.barackobama.com/2004/07/27/keynote_address 
_at_the_2004_de.php). 
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discrimination based on race.106  And the Supreme Court has 
increasingly embraced a notion that the regime of color consciousness 
that was once necessary to address historical discrimination against 
minorities is no longer necessary or justifiable and that race-neutral 
universalism must be the overarching concern for our legal system.107 
Yet, despite the Supreme Court’s rhetoric and the optimistic 
forecasts of certain pundits, racially charged incidents have continued 
to crop up, and disparate outcomes based on race have persisted.  
Much of the focus by journalists, activists, and government policy 
makers has been on the former.  However, as discussed in the sections 
that follow, although it is important not to minimize examples of 
continued overt bigotry in the United States, the more significant and 
widespread threat to African Americans likely happens in the 
shadows of everyday interactions. 
This discussion leads to a set of important questions: Why is our 
attention and energy on the issue of race in America largely focused 
on hate crimes and groups when disparate outcomes in education, 
housing, employment, health, and criminal justice seem to be a more 
significant problem?  What is the basis or justification for not 
addressing these outcomes and for relying on colorblind approaches? 
The answer, as this Article argues in Part I.B, lies in the power of a 
widely shared model of human behavior that assumes that most 
Americans are rational, autonomous choosers with control over their 
environments and destinies—the same model that underlies our 
current policies and opinions regarding guns.  As reviewed in Part II, 
the most recent scientific research suggests that this model is badly 
flawed. 
a.  Hate Groups and Hate Crimes 
There is some evidence that the election of the nation’s first black 
President—along with poor economic conditions and continuing 
concerns over immigration—has caused an increase in explicit 
bigotry against minorities.108  But a careful reading of the data 
 
106 See, e.g., Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965); Civil 
Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
107 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007) (arguably the first “post-racial” Supreme Court opinion); see also Cho, supra note 
102, at 1611–21. 
108 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 2; Mara Schiavocampo, 
Homegrown Hate Groups Increase in Number, MSNBC (June 10, 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30876593/. 
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suggests that the magnitude of the threat may be smaller than it would 
seem. 
A recent assessment by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
provided support for the view that right-wing extremism (particularly 
in the form of white supremacist groups and violent antigovernment 
groups) is on the rise,109 warning that Internet and other technological 
developments that facilitate recruitment and collaboration and allow 
greater access to training and tactical information make the threat 
significantly graver than it was in the 1990s.110  In 1995, there was 
one extremist Web site online; today, the Simon Wiesenthal Center 
has identified “some 10,000 problematic hate and terrorist websites, 
hate games and other internet postings.”111  Yet, while the numbers 
do suggest a greater public presence for those peddling hate, the 
figures do not necessarily imply an increase in bigotry, given general 
expansions in Internet use by all individuals and groups over the last 
fifteen years. 
The Southern Poverty Law Center, which has been keeping data on 
hate groups for almost thirty years, found that the number of such 
groups hit an all-time high in 2008, up four percent from 2007 and 
fifty-four percent since 2000.112  Again, though, the numbers are 
difficult to interpret and may not suggest an increased threat to 
minorities but rather a greater current online presence by hate groups 
than ten years ago—making them easier to spot—and more effective 
tracking by monitors.  Moreover, although some groups experienced 
growth in the last surveyed year, others saw declines in chapters and 
overall membership.  The Ku Klux Klan, for example, which had seen 
its membership decreasing since 2000, experienced an expansion in 
2008 with the formation of thirty-one new chapters across the United 
States, while thirteen neo-Nazi chapters closed over the course of the 
year.113 
Similar dynamics seem to be at work with respect to hate crimes.  
Although it is very difficult to draw clear trends from FBI hate crime 
statistics because of the variability of reporting customs across 
jurisdictions and changing crime identification practices over time, 
 
109 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 2, at 9. 
110 See id. 
111 Press Release, Simon Wiesenthal Center, supra note 25. 
112 See DAVID HOLTHOUSE, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., INTELLIGENCE REPORT: THE 
YEAR IN HATE (2009), available at http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp 
?aid=1027 (finding 926 hate groups in 2008). 
113 See id. 
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the most recent data suggest an increase in the number of hate crimes 
committed against blacks.114  From 2007 to 2008, there was an eight 
percent increase in the number of attacks on blacks, and blacks now 
suffer 72.6% of race-motivated crimes.115 
As commentators have pointed out, because of reporting failures—
at the individual, precinct, and state level—the absolute number of 
hate crime incidents reported by the FBI is likely to be significantly 
understated.116  In 2008, for example, Alabama reported exactly 
eleven incidents, Mississippi reported four, and Georgia reported 
nine.117  Given the long history of discrimination, intimidation, and 
violence in these three states and the size of the implicated 
population, it seems highly implausible that there were only twenty-
four hate crime incidents over the course of the year.118 
Still, the ultimate magnitude of the threat to minorities is difficult 
to assess.  A number of experts have argued that the danger of overt 
racist violence is actually quite minimal.  Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, for 
example, has characterized hate-fueled violence as “terrible but 
uncommon,”119 and Eric Hickey has noted that “[t]o date, acts of hate 
 
114 Hate Crimes Against Blacks, Religious Groups Rise, USA TODAY, Nov. 23, 2009.  
There were a total of 7783 hate crimes in 2008, which was an increase of two percent from 
the previous year.  UNIF. CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2008: INCIDENTS AND OFFENSES (2008) [hereinafter HATE 
CRIME STATISTICS, 2008], available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2008 
/documents/incidentsandoffenses.pdf; UNIF. CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, FED. BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2007: INCIDENTS AND OFFENSES (2007) 
[hereinafter HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2007], available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr 
/hc2007/downloadablepdfs/incidentsandoffenses.pdf. 
115 HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2008, supra note 114; HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2007, 
supra note 114. 
116 Deborah Tedford, FBI Report Notes Rise in Hate Crimes, NPR, Nov. 23, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120715771. 
117 2008 Hate Crime Statistics, Table 12, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2008), 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2008/data/table_12.html. 
118 See Tedford, supra note 116.  To provide some perspective, in 2008, New Jersey 
reported 744 incidents, Massachusetts reported 333, and Michigan reported 560.  2008 
Hate Crime Statistics, Table 12, supra note 117.  According to the Southern Poverty Law 
Center, there are twenty-nine percent more hate groups operating in Alabama, Georgia, 
and Mississippi than in Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey.  Hate Map, Active U.S. 
Hate Groups, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/intel/map/hate.jsp (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
119 Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Don’t Overreact, Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 
2009, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/hate-crimes-and-extremist        
-politics/ (“[A] very large majority of those who attack others because of their victims’ 
race . . . are not hard-core bigots who join supremacist groups or expound their views in 
websites or manifestos.”). 
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murder . . . are sporadically committed by only a handful of 
offenders.”120 
Nonetheless, with several high profile incidents in the wake of 
President Obama’s election, including the von Brunn attack outside 
the Holocaust Museum, and threats to Obama himself, overt racism 
has gained a great deal of popular attention.121  As detailed earlier, it 
has elicited significant coverage by the media, as well as from 
government policy makers.122  The Obama Administration has 
focused its attention on hate crimes of all types by increasing staffing 
in the Civil Rights Division, by bringing more cases against bigots 
who engage in criminal behavior, and by signing into law new hate 
crime legislation.123  The Administration has also attempted to 
intervene before hate violence erupts through the new Lone Wolf 
Initiative, which was created in the wake of the von Brunn murder,124 
and the broader Operation Vigilant Eagle, which targets white 
supremacists and other extremist groups.125 
b.  Disparate Outcomes 
The statistics on the apparent rise in hate groups and hate crimes in 
recent months and years, while potentially not as grave as generally 
reported, offer insight into the existence of overt racism in the modern 
United States and are worthy of our attention.  However, they have a 
tendency to overshadow other, subtler—but arguably more 
consequential—evidence of the continued disadvantaged position of 
African Americans.  Across a range of contexts—including health, 
employment, housing, and education—the data show blacks lagging 
behind whites, often by staggering margins. 
 
120 Hickey, supra note 22. 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 6–19.  During the 2008 campaign, Obama 
received more threats than any other presidential candidate on record and a number of 
white supremacists were arrested for threatening or planning to assassinate him.  
HOLTHOUSE, supra note 112. 
122 See supra text accompanying notes 20–26. 
123 See supra text accompanying notes 20–26; see also Jeff Zeleny, Obama Signs Hate 
Crimes Bill, The Caucus, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2009, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com 
/2009/10/28/obama-signs-hate-crimes-bill/. 
124 See Gary Fields & Evan Perez, FBI Seeks to Target Lone Extremists, WALL ST. J., 
June 15, 2009, at A3. 
125 See Cam Simpson & Gary Fields, Veterans a Focus of FBI Extremist Probe, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 17, 2009, at A3. 
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In 2006, the teenage birth rate of blacks was almost twice that of 
whites, as was the percentage of low-birth-weight babies.126  The 
average life expectancy of a black child born that year is five years 
less than the average life expectancy of a white child.127  Part of that 
story has to do with chronic health problems afflicting blacks at 
higher levels than whites.  The death rate from Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus in 2006 was more than seven times greater 
for black men than for white men, and it was more than seventeen 
times greater for black women than for white women.128  In addition, 
over half of African American women are considered obese based on 
Body Mass Index (BMI) compared to just over thirty percent of white 
women.129  Yet, black households are more than twice as likely to 
have food insecurity as white households, with one in ten black 
households having “very low food security.”130 
The schooling, employment, and housing numbers are similarly 
stark.  As of 2008, 30.5% of white men had attained a college degree 
or higher, whereas only 18.7% of black men had.131  Moreover, the 
average black man with a bachelor’s degree earned over $20,000 less 
than his white counterpart.132  The disparity extends into the 
unemployment rolls, where recent data show that 10.1% of the black 
civilian labor force is unemployed as opposed to 5.2% of the white 
 
126 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, SECTION 
2: BIRTHS, DEATHS, MARRIAGES, AND DIVORCES tbls. 84, 86 (2010), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/10statab/vitstat.pdf. 
127 Id. at tbl.102. 
128 Id. at tbl.123. 
129 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, SECTION 
3: HEALTH AND NUTRITION tbl.206 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod 
/2009pubs/10statab/health.pdf (finding that 34.4% of black men are considered obese as 
compared to 31.6% of white men). 
130 MARK NORD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2008 11 (2009).  “In households with very low food security, the food 
intake of some household members was reduced, and their normal eating patterns were 
disrupted because of the household’s food insecurity.”  Id. at iii. 
131 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, SECTION 
4: EDUCATION tbl.225 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs 
/10statab/educ.pdf. 
132 Id. at tbl.227. 
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labor force.133  With respect to housing, in 2008, 74.9% of whites 
owned their own homes compared with 47.5% of blacks.134 
The criminal justice system provides some of the most compelling 
evidence of unequal experiences: blacks receive harsher treatment 
from the moment they encounter a police officer all the way through 
sentencing.  In one representative study, more than seventy-five 
percent of the drivers on Interstate 95 who were stopped and searched 
by the Maryland State Police were black, despite blacks’ making up a 
drastically smaller proportion of travelers on the highway.135  A more 
recent study in Ohio showed that African Americans are twice as 
likely to receive traffic citations as non-African Americans.136  And 
research shows that officers “use greater force, including lethal force, 
with minority suspects than with White suspects.”137  Although less 
than fourteen percent of the U.S. population is African American, 
forty percent of defendants in felony cases are black, and the chance 
that a black will serve time in prison is 18.6%, compared to only a 
3.4% chance for a white person.138  In addition, blacks receive higher 
bails139 and longer sentences than whites,140 and they make up forty-
one percent of the death row population.141 
 
133 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, SECTION 
12: LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND EARNINGS tbl.576 (2010), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/10statab/labor.pdf. 
134 RAKESH KOCHLAR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THROUGH BOOM AND BUST: 
MINORITIES, IMMIGRANTS AND HOMEOWNERSHIP (2009). 
135 Michael Schneider, State Police I-95 Drug Unit Found to Search Black Motorists 4 
Times More Often than White, BALT. SUN, May 23, 1996, at B2; see also I. Bennett 
Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 850 (discussing similar data); 
David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme 
Court and Pretextual Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 564–65 (1997). 
136 David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While 
Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 267–68 (1999). 
137 Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in 
the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1006 (2007). 
138 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 
STATISTICS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#findings. 
139 See Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail 
Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987, 992 (1994). 
140 See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: 
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 300 (2001). 
141 See David Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1652 (1998). 
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B.  The Common Narrative 
Underlying many of the arguments, policies, regulations, laws, and 
practices related to firearms and race are basic assumptions about 
human behavior.  Whether we are conscious of it or not, all of us 
engage and interpret the world based on a naive psychological 
account of why people act the way that they do.142  The 
commonsense narrative, for example, helps us to explain why, as just 
discussed, blacks are pulled over more than whites while driving and 
why more African American women suffer from obesity than white 
women.  It can also help us to decide who or what is to blame when it 
comes to the thousands of gun-related deaths that occur in the United 
States each year.  And it can drive government initiatives and court 
opinions on issues like addressing poverty and interpreting the 
Constitution. 
As detailed in other work, particularly in Western cultures,143 the 
naive psychological account that most of us rely on most of the time 
is based on the idea that humans are rational, autonomous, self-
transparent actors.144  People are driven to act by readily identifiable 
dispositional factors (e.g., stable personality traits, beliefs, and 
attitudes), not by unseen or unappreciated elements in their situations 
(e.g., unconscious cognitive proclivities and structures and external 
environmental forces).145  In this model, human behavior and 
 
142 Social psychologists commonly refer to “folk psychology” in describing the implicit 
theory of human thinking and behavior “that growing up in society has provided us.”  
ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 19 (2d ed. 1995); see also 
Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution 
Process, 10 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 173 (1977). 
143 There is considerable research that suggests that non-Westerners may have different 
attributional tendencies than those living in individualistic Western cultures.  See, e.g., 
RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: HOW ASIANS AND WESTERNERS 
THINK DIFFERENTLY . . . AND WHY (2003); Michelle Gabler et al., Latin American, Asian, 
and American Cultural Differences in Perceptions of Spousal Abuse, 83 PSYCHOL. REP. 
587, 587–91 (1998); Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self: 
Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 224 (1991); 
Michael W. Morris & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese 
Attributions for Social and Physical Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 949, 
964 (1994). 
144 See, e.g., Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 27; Hanson & Yosifon, The 
Situational Character, supra note 27; Benforado & Hanson, supra note 27. 
145 The tendency to attribute the actions and outcomes of others to dispositional factors 
and to underestimate the influence of situational factors has been shown in thousands of 
experiments over many years and is commonly referred to as the “fundamental attribution 
error.”  See, e.g., ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 428–32 
(1999); LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: 
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resulting outcomes are controllable and reflect individual preferences; 
thus, absent some clear, explicit source of coercion, it follows that 
people should be held accountable for their choices, good or bad.146 
1.  The Conscious Racist 
The rational actor narrative powerfully informs the issue of racism 
and discrimination.  Under this conceptual model—which is 
consonant with what Sumi Cho has described as the emerging 
mainstream consensus of “post-racialism”147—racial bias is a 
conscious choice.148  You choose to be a bigot, or you choose not to 
be.  It is about self-control.  And racial bias is easy to spot.  Those 
who demonstrate it wear white hoods and march in parades with 
swastika armbands.  They fly Confederate flags and tell racist jokes 
on the job.  They visit white supremacist Web sites, attend rallies, and 
burn crosses.  Racial discrimination happens when someone who 
hates blacks or Latinos or Asians explicitly refuses to hire a minority 
candidate because of his race or bars minorities from using a golf 
course.  Overt bad acts reveal bad dispositions and show us the extent 
of the threat.  Richard Ford’s description of “the racist” is 
representative of this common narrative: “The racist is a fossil of an 
ancien régime of blood privilege and also a pathetic and potentially 
dangerous psychopath; a fetishist of skin, hair, and lips; a moral 
pervert.”149 
 
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 125–33 (1991); Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. 
Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21 (1995).  As Lee Ross and 
Donna Shestowsky explain, “Due to this bias, laypeople are prone to overestimate the 
degree of stability likely to be manifest in a given individual’s behavior over time and 
across different contexts, and to underestimate the extent to which changes in the 
particular circumstances or environment confronting that individual might produce 
significant changes in his or her behavior.”  Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, 
Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1081, 1092–93 (2003) (footnote omitted). 
146 See Alan Page Fiske et al., The Cultural Matrix of Social Psychology, in 2 THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 915, 920 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) 
(“The person is believed to consist of a set of ‘internal,’ ‘personal’ attributes . . . .  Taken 
together, these attributes define each person as an autonomous, freely choosing, special 
individual.”). 
147 See Cho, supra note 102, at 1592–94. 
148 See Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Scholarly Retort: Keeping Social 
Psychology out of Academia, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW (forthcoming 2011). 
149 RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES 
RACE RELATIONS WORSE 30 (2008). 
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And so it follows that, to deal with the problem of racism, all we 
need to do is clamp down hard on the few hate mongers in our midst 
who demonstrate overt bigotry.  When we lock up all of the neo-
Nazis, bigoted cops who brutalize black suspects, and employers who 
use the “n” word, we will have largely addressed the problem of 
racism because the problem is to be found entirely inside a few bad 
apples, not in situational factors—like the historical legacy of slavery 
or powerful racial stereotypes in mainstream society.  Consequently, 
any lingering disparate racial outcomes can be assumed to have 
nothing to do with racial prejudice.  Rather, they must reflect freely 
made choices and dispositional flaws in those who are 
“underperforming.”  Ongoing racial segregation is a result of black 
people choosing to live with those with whom they feel most 
comfortable.  The high poverty rate of black families and high 
delinquency rate of young black males can be traced to the bad 
decisions of black fathers who fail to exercise personal responsibility 
and abandon their children. 
This narrative is the defining one when it comes to race—and it has 
found its way into our laws and is reflected in our social and political 
discourse. 
The legal conception of discrimination is grounded in the notion of 
rational, conscious choice.150  In the employment context, under Title 
VII, to prevail under a “disparate treatment” theory, it is necessary for 
a black employee “to prove not only that he received less favorable 
treatment than his [white] coworkers, but that his superiors 
purposefully, deliberately, and intentionally treated him differently 
because of his [race].”151  As Linda Hamilton Krieger has 
summarized, 
 [I]ntergroup discrimination . . . is assumed to result from 
discriminatory motive or intent.  . . .  In the stories told by disparate 
treatment case law, there is no discrimination without an invidiously 
motivated actor.  . . . 
 
150 See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On 
Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 CAL. L. REV. 747, 753 (2001) 
(“[A]ntidiscrimination law is inadequate because it targets mainly intentional 
discrimination, missing the more prevalent contemporary forms of bias that are often 
nondeliberate or unconscious.”). 
151 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1163 (1995); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (offering 
the first articulation of the theory). 
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 [In addition], disparate treatment analysis assumes that, unless 
they harbor discriminatory intent or motive, decisionmakers will act 
objectively and judge rationally.  . . . 
 . . . . 
 Finally, disparate treatment jurisprudence—indeed the entire 
normative structure of anti-discrimination law—is based on an 
assumption that decisionmakers possess “transparency of mind,” 
that they can accurately identify why they are about to make, or 
have already made, a particular decision.152 
Similar notions underlie the U.S. approach to jury selection.  
Members of a jury pool cannot be excluded pursuant to a peremptory 
challenge solely because they belong to a “cognizable racial 
group.”153  The underlying assumption is that there are some 
attorneys out there who consciously choose to discriminate and that 
those “bad apples” can be identified by requiring them to articulate a 
race-neutral justification for their peremptory challenge after the 
opposing attorney has established a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination.154 
Given other changes in the law, one might assume that more recent 
case law is less reliant on the self-transparent, autonomous, rational 
actor model, but the model remains dominant.  Indeed, whether it 
reflects new “post-racialism” or the existing framework of 
“colorblindness,” race jurisprudence from the Roberts Court shows 
the continuing potency of the narrative.155  In the 2007 case Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the 
Chief Justice’s opinion manifested an understanding that race-based 
government approaches—whether related to affirmative action, 
minority voting, or school desegregation—are all rigorously 
scrutinized because, outside of a few overt bigots, modern Americans 
clearly do not carry racial biases that might cause disparate 
outcomes.156  Racial inequalities certainly do exist, and they are 
regrettable, but they can be addressed either by universal reforms or 
in dispositional approaches within the black community in the form of 
 
152 Krieger, supra note 151, at 1166–67. 
153 Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral 
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge 
Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 262 (2007) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 80 (1986)); see also Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious 
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005). 
154 Sommers & Norton, supra note 153, at 262–63. 
155 See Cho, supra note 102, at 1620. 
156 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
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self-help and individual discipline.157  To suggest otherwise—that 
some sort of racial bias is behind disparate impacts and that race-
based policies are necessary—is to “play the race card” and to reveal 
one’s own bad disposition, indeed, one’s “racism.”158  As Chief 
Justice Roberts explained in Parents Involved, “The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the 
basis of race.”159 
Despite being across the political aisle, Barack Obama’s “post-
racialist” vision is similarly indebted to the autonomous, rational-
actor model.  Whether it is genuine or simply a way to appeal to the 
mass populace, much of the President’s rhetoric has focused on 
personal responsibility, diligence, and self-discipline by members of 
the black community.  In a speech on Father’s Day, for example, he 
connected problems in the black community to poor parenting and 
lack of discipline.160  In line with the narrative outlined above, he 
called upon fathers to exercise “responsibility” and suggested that 
violence among young black males could be eliminated by instilling 
the values of self-respect and hard work.161  The narrative also helps 
to explain the Obama Administration’s vigorous attack on hate 
crimes—hate crimes are both the center and outer edge of racism in 
our country.  Hate crimes situate race-based violence in the bad 
disposition-driven choices of readily identifiable and discrete 
individuals and groups.  It follows that, if such crimes can be 
eliminated, we will have achieved the promise of post-racialism. 
2.  The Rational Shooter 
The same underlying model informs core conceptions of the Bill of 
Rights—including the Second Amendment.  Because people are 
 
157 In a post-racial world, there can be no race-based policies, only race-neutral 
universal ones.  See john a. powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 785, 791 (2009). 
158 See Cho, supra note 102, at 1603 (“[P]ost-racialism draws a moral equivalence 
between ‘racialism’ under Jim Crow which subordinated racial minorities, and the 
‘racialism’ of the civil-rights era, which sought to remedy minority subordination.”); see 
also FORD, supra note 149, at 27–30, 338 (drawing a strong distinction between those 
“like Rosa Parks [who] risked all to stand up to unabashed bigots who were backed by 
social convention and the force of law” and those modern “opportunists” and “gate-
crashers” who complain of “minor and ambiguous slights”). 
159 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 748. 
160 Obama’s Father’s Day Remarks, Transcript, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/us/politics/15text-obama.html. 
161 Id. 
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rational, autonomous individuals, the best system is one that provides 
them with the maximum possible freedom.  People control their 
environment through “free will”; the environment does not control 
people.  In the context of the First Amendment, as Ronald Dworkin 
has written, the “[g]overnment insults its citizens, and denies their 
moral responsibility, when it decrees that they cannot be trusted to 
hear opinions that might persuade them to dangerous or offensive 
convictions.”162  Thus, the assumption underlying the incitement 
standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio163 is “that, except in extreme 
circumstances, human beings can resist harmful messages through 
reflection and rational thought.”164  Acts of hatred reveal evil 
dispositions, not the influence of external situational forces.  Good 
people make good choices to resist bad messages. 
The same reasoning underlies the discourse surrounding the 
Second Amendment, whether at the level of simple slogans or 
Supreme Court opinions.  Gun deaths can be traced to the bad 
dispositions and choices of certain people, not to the guns themselves 
(or to subconscious or unconscious processes).  This truth is as 
obvious and clear as a bumper sticker:  “Guns don’t kill people; [bad] 
people kill people.”165  “Blaming guns for the deaths in the country is 
like blaming the gas chambers for the holocaust.”166  “If Guns Kill 
People . . . Do Pens Misspell Words?”167  From this viewpoint, it is 
patronizing to think that the public needs to be controlled by the 
government; the vast majority of people can take care of themselves 
because they are rational actors.  The state does not need to treat its 
citizens like children.  In fact, guns help protect us all from the evil 
around us.  It is our right to bear arms that keeps us safe from the few 
bad apples out there who might otherwise do us harm: “WHEN 
GUNS ARE OUTLAWED, ONLY OUTLAWS WILL HAVE 
GUNS.”168  And, just as important, our personal Second Amendment 
 
162 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 200 (1996). 
163 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
164 Matthew D. Bunker & David K. Perry, Standing at the Crossroads: Social Science, 
Human Agency and Free Speech Law, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2004). 
165 Gun Rights, STICKER GIANT.COM, http://www.stickergiant.com/guns_bgun_pg1 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
166 Gun Control—Bumper Stickers, RUSH ONLINE, http://www.rushonline.com 
/bumperstickers/guncontrol.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
167 Gun Bumper Stickers, ZAZZLE, http://www.zazzle.com/gun+bumperstickers (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
168 Gun Control—Bumper Stickers, supra note 166. 
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rights protect us from a tyrannical government that might take away 
our freedoms (particularly our freedom to choose).  As other pro-gun 
bumper stickers explain:  “An Armed Man Is A Citizen.  AN 
UNARMED MAN IS A SUBJECT.”169  “DO YOU TRUST A 
GOVERNMENT THAT CANNOT TRUST YOU WITH GUNS?”170  
“Stalin, Mao and Hitler All Favored Gun Control.”171  “First gun 
control, then mind control.”172  “It’s not gun control, it’s FREEDOM 
control.”173  Thus, guns come to embody ideals of individual 
autonomy and self-reliance.174  As Charlton Heston told an audience 
at the 2000 NRA Annual Meeting, “When ordinary hands can possess 
such an extraordinary instrument, that symbolizes the full measure of 
human dignity and liberty.”175 
Although the arguments are more sophisticated than the preceding 
slogans, the Supreme Court’s recent approach to the Second 
Amendment and much existing gun regulation reflects exactly the 
same underlying assumptions about rational, autonomous, self-
transparent actors.  Nowhere is this clearer than in the categories of 
people who are excluded from enjoying rights under the Amendment.  
18 U.S.C. § 922(g), enacted prior to Heller, prohibits those convicted 
of crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than a year, drug 
addicts, and “mental defectives,” among others, from possessing 
firearms.176  And the Court in Heller was explicit that nothing in the 
opinion “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”177  
Although Justice Breyer suggested that these exceptions were 
 
169 Gun Rights Bumper Stickers, Stickers, and Decals, CAFE PRESS, 
http://www.cafepress.com/+gun-rights+bumper-stickers?page=2&topic=106636 (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
170 Gun Rights, supra note 165. 
171 Guns Bumper Stickers and Small Stickers, BUMPER ART, http://www.bumperart.com 
/Guns.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
172 Gun Control—Bumper Stickers, supra note 166. 
173 Id. 
174 See Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1206 (2009). 
175 Charlton Heston, Opening Remarks to Members at the NRA Annual Meeting in 
Charlotte, North Carolina (May 20, 2000), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=TQtrdFYDzCU.  In his speech, Heston also warned of “the divisive forces that would 
take freedom away.”  Id. 
176 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). 
177 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17.  The Court reiterated this 
position in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010). 
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“judicial ipse dixit,”178 as Carlton F.W. Larson has pointed out, “it is 
hard to imagine the Court invaliding them in a future case,”179 and 
some lower courts have already weighed in that “Heller . . . was not 
intended to open the door to a raft of Second Amendment challenges 
to § 922(g) convictions.”180  What drug addicts, convicted criminals, 
and the mentally ill have in common is that they have all proven 
themselves to be less than rational.181  Moreover, courts have not 
“been inclined to distinguish between violent and nonviolent 
felons,”182 which implies that the prohibition on gun ownership turns 
on demonstrated “irrationality” rather than demonstrated 
“dangerousness.”183  This reading is bolstered by the fact that the 
only other notable group not mentioned in § 922(g), but also denied a 
right to gun ownership, is also commonly assumed to lack true and 
complete rationality: children.184  As discussed earlier, gun 
restrictions in schools continue to be fairly strict, and one possible 
 
178 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2870 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
179 Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia 
v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1372 (2009). 
180 United States v. Baron, Nos. CR-06-2095, CV-08-3048, 2008 WL 5102307, at *2 
(E.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 2008); see also, e.g., Triplett v. Roy, No. 08-40904, 2009 WL 
1154892, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 30, 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Brye, No. 08-12578, 
2009 WL 637553, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 13, 2009); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 
348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. McRobie, No. 08-4632, 2009 WL 82715, at *1 
(4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Brunson, 292 F. App’x 259, 261 
(4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Irish, 285 F. App’x 326, 327 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(per curiam); United States v. Frazier, No. 07-6135, 2008 WL 4949153, at *5 (6th Cir. 
Nov. 19, 2008). 
181 It is worth noting that while federal law does not include a parallel restriction, 
“[e]ighteen states and the District of Columbia [also] restrict access to firearms by alcohol 
abusers.”  LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA: AN 
EVALUATION AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL, STATE AND SELECTED LOCAL 
GUN LAWS viii (2008). 
182 Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower 
Courts and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1249 (2009). 
183 As further support for this proposition, both quadriplegics and blind people have 
been deemed to have a right to own firearms.  See, e.g., Martha Neil, Quadriplegic Has 
Right to Own Firearms, Judge Rules, ABA J., Nov. 11, 2009; Dave Kolpack, Blind Man 
Says His Gun Permit Does Not Make Him Dangerous, BISMARCK TRIB., May 15, 2007.  
Although they may lack the ability to hold a gun, pull the trigger, or see the target—all 
factors that might make their use of weapons more of a safety threat—individuals with 
these conditions demonstrate rationality. 
184 See LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 181, at 81–86 (summarizing 
federal, state, and local minimum age requirements for purchase and possession of 
firearms); 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), (c)(1), (x)(1–5) (federal law prohibits sale of most guns, 
with certain exceptions, to those under eighteen and possession of handguns by those 
under eighteen). 
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explanation is that we view children as more vulnerable and less 
rational actors. 
Even some of those who disagreed with the Heller majority and 
filed briefs urging the Court in McDonald not to apply the Second 
Amendment to the states seem to accept largely the same model.  
What they contest is not the idea that there are rational shooters and 
irrational shooters (who ought to be denied gun ownership rights) but 
the assumption that guns can be kept in the hands of the rational 
shooters.  As evidence, in the McDonald amicus briefs, for example, 
these advocates cite studies showing that many guns are stolen and 
ultimately end up in the possession of criminals;185 that mentally 
unstable people use guns to commit suicide;186 and that in the wake 
of loosened gun regulations, racist extremists will stockpile weapons 
that they will use in hate crimes.187 
The threat of guns is, thus, explicit—it lies in the dispositions and 
conscious choices of those who use them.  Putting together the 
narrative on racism and the narrative on gun rights, the conclusion is 
that the only danger of violence to minorities comes from the 
“irrational” people in our midst: bigoted lunatics like von Brunn.  
Root them out and lock them up or, alternatively, prevent them from 
getting weapons, and the threat to African Americans vanishes like 
smoke. 
II 
CHALLENGES TO THE DOMINANT AGENCY MODEL 
A.  Implicit Bias 
The dominant agency model is wrong.  The idea that we largely 
direct our thoughts and behavior through a conscious exertion of our 
will is strongly undermined by hundreds of peer-reviewed articles that 
establish that “people can possess attitudes, stereotypes, and 
prejudices in the absence of intention, awareness, deliberation, or 
effort.”188  Even as we continue to view ourselves as rational, self-
 
185 See Brief of the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys and District Attorneys as 
Amici Curiae at 18, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). 
186 See Brief of Amici Curiae Brady Center, supra note 41, at 11 
187 See Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League, supra note 3, at 5. 
188 See John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: 
A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten 
Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 42–43 
(2009). 
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transparent choosers, our actions—in every area of our lives—are 
being powerfully influenced by automatic processes that require no 
conscious initiation and that operate beyond our perception.189 
Part of our reflexive system that allows us to navigate information-
rich environments involves implicit intergroup attitudes.190  We carry 
automatic associations—reflecting beliefs about typical group 
attributes (that is, stereotypes) and affective responses to particular 
groups (that is, prejudice)—that help us quickly to make sense of the 
people we meet.191  Key associations—both positive and negative—
relate to “race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, social status, and other 
distinctions.”192 
Although researchers have employed a number of methods to 
measure implicit bias, the most widely used procedure is the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT).193  The IAT works by measuring response 
latencies as individuals attempt to categorize concepts on a 
computer—concepts that are strongly associated are quickly sorted, 
and those that are not strongly associated take subjects more time.194  
In a typical IAT, a participant in a study is provided with exemplars 
of two social categories (for example, whites or blacks, homosexuals 
or heterosexuals, old people or young people), which they must then 
associate with certain abstract evaluative concepts (often words that 
 
189 Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba & Brian A. Nosek, The Surprisingly Limited Malleability of 
Implicit Racial Evaluations, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 137 (2010). 
190 See Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 164 (2008). 
191 See also Charles M. Judd et al., Automatic Stereotypes vs. Automatic Prejudice: 
Sorting Out the Possibilities in the Payne (2001) Weapon Paradigm, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 75, 76 (2004). 
192 Jost et al., supra note 188, at 39. 
193 Other methods employed in research on implicit attitudes include “Stroop and 
lexical decisions tasks, supraliminal and subliminal priming procedures, and linguistic bias 
coding techniques.”  Jost et al., supra note 188, at 46; see also, e.g., Anthony G. 
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 945, 950–53 (2006) (reaction time); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming 
Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 
487–88 (2004) (priming); Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of 
Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 
729–30 (2000) (brain scan). 
194 See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association 
Test: III, Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 
18 (2009). 
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have positive or negative valences, like “joy,” “love,” “happiness,” 
“agony,” “pain,” and “evil”).195 
With respect to race, 
people who are faster to categorize the faces or names of whites 
when they are paired with positive (vs. negative) stimuli and, 
conversely, the faces or names of blacks when they are paired with 
negative (vs. positive) stimuli, are theorized to have internalized a 
stronger preference for whites relative to blacks, compared to 
people who respond more equivalently across different category-
valence pairings (or in the opposite direction).196 
Since 1998, more than 4.5 million IATs have been taken,197 and 
the results show pervasive implicit racial bias: indeed, about seventy 
percent of those who have taken the race-bias version of the test were 
found to exhibit “an unconscious, or implicit, preference for white 
people compared to blacks.”198  The tendency has been demonstrated 
in both whites and blacks, although whites show a far stronger “white 
preference” on the IAT, and blacks demonstrate much greater 
variation in their preferences (on average, blacks demonstrate a slight 
white preference, but some blacks show a strong black preference and 
some a strong white preference).199  In addition, implicit racial bias—
as a process operating in the unconscious—“can exist even in those 
who espouse egalitarian values.”200  People who strongly favor equal 
treatment for all races and do not believe themselves to favor one race 
over another can nonetheless produce IAT scores that reveal implicit 
racial bias.  And implicit bias is present in people in a variety of 
 
195 Id.; R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal 
Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1182 (2006). 
196 Jost et al., supra note 188, at 45; see also Greenwald et al., supra note 194. 
197 See General Information, PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://www.projectimplicit.net/general 
info.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).  On the Web site, readers can take a variety of 
different IATs. 
198 Predictive Validity Meta-Analysis of the Implicit Association Test Is Published, 
PROJECT IMPLICIT (June 19, 2009), http://projectimplicit.wordpress.com/2009/06/19 
/predictive-validity-meta-analysis-of-the-implicit-association-test-is-published/. 
199 See Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a 
Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 104–05 (2002).  Implicit bias also 
appears to impact attitudes toward other racial groups including Asians and Hispanics.  
See, e.g., L. Son Hing et al., Inducing Hypocrisy to Reduce Prejudicial Responses Among 
Aversive Racists, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 71 (2002); Eric Uhlman et al., 
Subgroup Prejudice Based on Skin Color Among Hispanics in the United States and Latin 
America, 20 SOC. COGNITION 198, 198 (2002). 
200 Joy-Gaba & Nosek, supra note 189; see also Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness 
and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUROPEAN REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1, 36 (2007). 
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different settings: doctors and nurses, police officers, students, and 
employment recruiters, among many others, all have demonstrated 
white preference on the IAT.201  Indeed, recent research shows that 
even judges harbor implicit racial biases.202 
If people exhibit unconscious prejudice and stereotyping about 
blacks, what, specifically, are the stereotypes in operation?  Although 
“black,” as a racial category, appears to “function[] as the prototypical 
associate for a number of ostensibly race-neutral concepts, such as . . . 
jazz, basketball, and ghetto,”203 the most common stereotype applied 
to blacks appears to involve linking them to crime and violence.204  
Moreover, this latter association appears to be bidirectional: “Black 
faces and Black bodies can trigger thoughts of crime, [just as] 
thinking of crime can trigger thoughts of Black people.”205 
B.  Bias in Action 
1.  General Background 
Whether they reflect cultural factors or more “‘personal,’ 
idiosyncratic preferences,”206 the critical point is that implicit 
prejudice and stereotypes are more than just “thoughts” in peoples’ 
heads; they have real world impacts.  Automatic associations 
influence behavior by both professionals and laypeople in 
employment, medical, voting, law enforcement, and countless other 
contexts.207 
 
201 Jost et al., supra note 188, at 39. 
202 Rachlinski et al., supra note 102, at 1221.  The researchers “found that the black 
judges produced IAT scores comparable to those observed in the sample of black subjects 
obtained on the Internet.  The white judges, on the other hand, demonstrated a statistically 
significantly stronger white preference than that observed among a sample of white 
subjects obtained on the Internet.”  Id. at 1210–11. 
203 Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 877 (2004). 
204 Banks et al., supra note 195, at 1172 (citing Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, 
Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139 (1995); PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE 
SCAR OF RACE 43–45 (1993)); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: 
Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383 (2006) (“People associate Black physical traits with criminality in 
particular.”). 
205 Eberhardt et al., supra note 203, at 876. 
206 Jost et al., supra note 188, at 60. 
207 Id. at 1, 5–6. 
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When presented with black faces as opposed to white faces, those 
showing stronger racial bias on the IAT demonstrate greater 
activation in the amygdala—part of the brain associated with 
emotion208—and that neural activity appears to lead to contrasting 
behavior based on race.  In a representative study, researchers found 
that those physicians who demonstrated IAT scores that showed a 
white preference chose less effective treatments for hypothetical black 
patients suffering coronary artery disease than they did for white 
patients with identical symptoms.209  This was despite the fact that 
the doctors did not report any explicit preference for whites over 
blacks or any belief that blacks were more or less cooperative than 
whites.210  In another set of studies, researchers found that employers 
who had received résumés to review were far more likely to call back 
candidates with white names than equally qualified candidates with 
black names and that race-sensitive résumé selection appears to be 
linked to implicit stereotyping scores.211  Likewise, IAT performance 
has been tied to social behavior toward blacks, including body 
openness and positioning, eye contact, and seating distance.212 
Members of the criminal justice system are not immune to the 
power of implicit racial bias.  Jennifer Eberhardt and her colleagues 
found that priming police officers with the concept of “crime” led 
officers to attend to black faces and to misremember black faces that 
 
208 See William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing 
of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806, 806 (2004). 
209 See Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of 
Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 
1235 (2007). 
210 See id. 
211 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal?  A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. 
ECON. REV. 991 (2004); Marianne Bertrand et al., Implicit Discrimination, 95 AM. ECON. 
REV. 94 (2005). 
212 See Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit 
Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 440 (2001); see also John F. Dovido et al., Implicit 
and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
62, 62 (2002) (“[T]he response latency measure significantly predicted Whites’ nonverbal 
friendliness [toward Black partners] and the extent to which the confederates and 
observers perceived bias in the participants’ friendliness . . . .”).  Priming with the black 
racial category may also result in altered behavior—including increased hostility—more 
generally.  See, e.g., John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects 
of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 230, 230, 239 (1996) (“[P]articipants for whom the African American 
stereotype was primed subliminally reacted with more hostility to a vexatious request of 
the experimenter” and the reaction was not predicted by explicit racism measures.). 
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they had seen as more stereotypical (that is, more representative) of 
the black racial category than they actually were.213  Investigators 
have also documented that judicial behavior may be affected by 
implicit biases in certain circumstances.214 
Overall, a 2009 meta-analysis of IAT research reports found that 
the predicative validity of the IAT for racially differential behavior, 
judgments, and physiological manifestations was strong and 
“significantly exceeded the predictive validity of self-report 
measures.”215 
2.  Shooter Bias 
Although consequential, much of the behavior discussed in the 
previous subsection relating to implicit racial bias does not have 
direct life-and-death implications.  Yet, research over the last decade 
has documented just such a connection between automatic processes 
and lethal outcomes.  This work provides the strongest evidence that 
the commonsense narrative of rational shooters and conscious racists, 
investigated earlier, is largely inaccurate and that blacks face a threat 
from firearms that is both far more significant and different in 
character than that posed to whites. 
Experimental evidence suggests that both private citizens and 
police officers use race in their decision making related to 
shooting.216  When participants are exposed to black faces they are 
quicker to identify photographed objects as guns than when they are 
 
213 Eberhardt et al., supra note 203, at 891 (“Thus, the association between blackness 
and criminality was not only triggered, it was magnified.”). 
214 Rachlinski et al., supra note 102, at 1221. 
215 Greenwald et al., supra note 194, at 17, 32; see also Jost et al., supra note 188, at 46 
(“[T]he evidence for the predictive validity (or behavioral significance) of implicit bias . . . 
is already strong, and it continues to grow in depth and breadth.”). 
216 See, e.g., Correll et al., supra note 137 (police officers); Joshua Correll et al., Event-
Related Potentials and the Decision to Shoot: The Role of Threat Perception and 
Cognitive Control, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 126 (2006) [hereinafter 
Correll et al., Event-Related Potentials] (members of the public); E. Ashby Plant & B. 
Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers’ Responses to Criminal 
Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180, 180 (2005) (police officers); Anthony G. Greenwald et 
al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 399 (2003) (members of the public); Joshua Correll 
et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially 
Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314 (2002) [hereinafter 
Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma] (members of the public); see also Jerry Kang, 
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) (introducing some of the early 
studies to the law review literature, but appearing before any of the work on police officers 
and the impact of training—the basis of this Article—had been published). 
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exposed to white faces;217 they are also more likely to misidentify 
objects as guns when required to respond quickly.218 
Beyond the issue of weapons identification, individuals appear to 
demonstrate a bias in actually pulling the trigger.  Since 2002, 
researchers have conducted more than twenty studies designed to 
assess the influence of race on “shoot/don’t-shoot” decision 
making.219  These studies have generally used a video-game-like 
simulation in which participants are presented with images of people 
holding different objects (e.g., wallets, cell phones, and guns) in 
various environments.220  Participants are told to respond by shooting 
all armed individuals and not shooting all unarmed individuals.  In the 
experiments, researchers have found that people show racial bias both 
with respect to how fast they make decisions to shoot or not to shoot 
and to how accurate those decisions ultimately are.221  As Joshua 
Correll and his coauthors summarize, “Participants are faster and 
more accurate when shooting an armed Black man rather than an 
armed White man, and faster and more accurate when responding 
‘don’t shoot’ to an unarmed White man rather than an unarmed Black 
man.”222  Scores on explicit prejudice scales do not correlate with 
shooter bias.223  However, experimental participants who demonstrate 
 
217 See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and 
Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
181, 187 (2001). 
218 Id. at 189; see also Judd et al., supra note 191, at 80 (finding that black face primes 
facilitate the identification of both handguns and sports-related objects and result in less 
misidentifications than white face primes).  In addition, Jennifer Eberhardt and her 
colleagues have found that “in cases involving a White victim, the more stereotypically 
Black a defendant is perceived to be, the more likely that person is to be sentenced to 
death.”  Eberhardt et al., supra note 204, at 383–84. 
219 See Correll et al., supra note 137, at 1007. 
220 See, e.g., Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma, supra note 216, at 1314.  A 
sample simulation is available at Shooter Effect, UNIV. OF CHI., http://backhand.uchicago 
.edu/Center/ShooterEffect/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
221 See, e.g., Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma, supra note 216, at 1325. 
222 Correll et al., supra note 137, at 1007; see also Correll et al., Event-Related 
Potentials, supra note 216, at 127 (“[B]oth threat perception and conflict detection play an 
important role, and crucially, . . . racial cues promote biased shooting behavior because (a) 
Black targets seem more threatening than White targets, and (b) White targets conflict 
more strongly with the tendency to shoot than do Black targets.”); Greenwald et al., supra 
note 216 (“[T]wo race effects . . . led to Blacks being incorrectly shot at more than Whites: 
a perceptual sensitivity effect (when held by Blacks guns were less distinguishable from 
harmless objects) and a response bias effect (objects held by Blacks were more likely to be 
treated as guns).”). 
223 See, e.g., Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma, supra note 216, at 1322. 
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implicit associations between blacks and weapons are more biased in 
their shooting behavior.224  The notion that, at the unconscious level, 
racial stereotypes have a stronger impact on firing decisions than 
general negative sentiments toward African Americans is bolstered by 
the fact that white and black participants demonstrate equivalent 
levels of shooter bias.225 
Although the main focus of this Article is on African Americans 
and shooter bias, it is worth noting that several recent studies suggest 
that blacks may not be the only minorities at risk of racially biased 
shooting behavior.  For example, researchers have found significant 
bias with respect to shoot/don’t shoot decision making concerning 
targets wearing stereotypical Islamic garb.226 
C.  Controlling for Bias 
1.  General Background 
Despite the potency and pervasiveness of implicit bias, 
discriminatory judgments and behavior are not inevitable.227  In fact, 
recent studies suggest that interior and exterior situational factors—
including “the nature of the decision, availability of cognitive 
resources, individuating information, and motivation”—can mediate 
 
224 See Glaser & Knowles, supra note 190, at 167–71; see also Correll et al., The Police 
Officer’s Dilemma, supra note 216, at 1320–21. 
225 See, e.g., Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma, supra note 216, at 1325; see 
also Judd et al., supra note 191, at 80. 
226 Christian Unkelbach et al., The Turban Effect: The Influence of Muslim Headgear 
and Induced Affect on Aggressive Responses in the Shooter Bias Paradigm, 44 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1409, 1409 (2008) (targets depicted wearing Islamic head 
dress).  Kevin K. Fleming, Carole L. Bandy, and Matthew O. Kimble documented a 
similar effect with a sample of young military cadets who had never been in a combat 
situation.  Kevin K. Fleming et al., Decisions to Shoot in a Weapon Identification Task: 
The Influence of Cultural Stereotypes and Perceived Threat on False Positive Errors, 5 
SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 201, 204, 212 (2010).  The cadets were asked to press a “shoot” key 
whenever they were presented with an image of a gun and a “don’t shoot” key whenever 
they were presented with an image of a tool.  Id. at 208.  They were faster and more 
accurate in deciding to shoot after being primed with images of blacks and Middle Eastern 
males in traditional clothing, and they were slower and less accurate when primed with 
images of whites and Middle Eastern males in western clothing.  Id. at 212.  Likewise, 
images of blacks and Middle Eastern men led to “more false positive errors and fewer 
correct rejections for the tools.”  Id. 
227 See, e.g., Joy-Gaba & Nosek, supra note 189 (“[T]he growing body of evidence 
challenging the assumption of automatic inflexibility . . . [and encouraging a] new 
understanding of automaticity as contextually sensitive and amenable to change”). 
 2010] Quick on the Draw 45 
unconscious biases.228  Although work on the malleability of implicit 
social cognition is ongoing,229 researchers have advanced a number 
of approaches aimed at overcoming implicit bias including 
“cultivating egalitarian motives[;] exposing people to favorable, 
counterstereotypical exemplars[;] providing opportunities for 
emotional reconditioning[;] increasing vigilance about one’s subtle 
behavior during interactions with disadvantaged others[;] and 
educating people about their implicit biases.”230 
With respect to several of the studies documenting implicit bias 
and its role in behavior, researchers have provided evidence for 
effective compensation strategies.  Physicians in the study of coronary 
artery disease who had IAT scores that revealed implicit bias, for 
example, were more likely to offer the optimal treatment to black 
patients when they were aware that the study was designed to look at 
racially disparate outcomes than when they were not.231  Similarly, 
Jeffrey Rachlinski and his coauthors found that, although judges carry 
implicit racial bias just like the rest of the population, “when judges 
are aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the influence 
of implicit racial biases, and are motivated to suppress that bias, they 
appear able to do so.”232  Based on these findings, they suggested that 
to minimize the impact of unconscious bias on judicial decision 
making, the criminal justice system ought to consider “exposing 
judges to stereotype-incongruent models, providing testing and 
training, auditing judicial decisions, and altering courtroom 
 
228 Page & Pitts, supra note 102, at 28 (offering a nice summary of the existing 
debiasing literature); see also Joy-Gaba & Nosek, supra note 189 (“[T]here are personal 
and social factors that may elicit shifts in the activation or expression of implicit racial 
biases.”). 
229 The robustness of current research suggests that such malleability is beyond doubt, 
but there is some concern that current published studies may overestimate the extent to 
which implicit biases may be reduced or controlled for.  Joy-Gaba & Nosek, supra note 
189, at 143–45; see also Jost et al., supra note 188, at 63.  “The fact that implicit prejudice 
is observed at all under typical laboratory conditions—when the average participant has 
plenty of access to cognitive resources, can often discern that the study is about racial (or 
other intergroup) attitudes, and is under significant impression management constraints—
suggests that laboratory studies probably contribute to underestimates rather than 
overestimates of prejudice.”  Id.  Jost and his colleagues, for example, have been very 
critical of assertions that accountability pressures alone can reduce or eliminate bias.  See 
id. at 61–63. 
230 Jost et al., supra note 188, at 56 (citations omitted). 
231 Green et al., supra note 209, at 1235–37 (“This suggests that implicit bias can be 
recognized and modulated to counteract its effects on treatment decisions.”). 
232 Rachlinski et al., supra note 102, at 1221. 
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practices.”233  Some of these situational factors may allow individuals 
to intervene before their implicit racial bias impacts their behavior, 
while other factors may lead to disrupting implicit associations 
directly. 
2.  Shooter Bias 
As with other research on implicit social cognition, a number of 
shooter bias studies reveal that the unconscious influence of race on 
judgments and actions varies as a result of contextual factors and 
individual motivations, backgrounds, and experiences.  For instance, 
Correll and his colleagues have documented that being exposed to 
newspaper stories about black criminals prior to participating in a 
simulation increases shooter bias.234  Likewise, being exposed to 
stereotypic (as opposed to counterstereotypic) targets during the 
actual simulation also influences the magnitude of racial bias.235  
With respect to individual factors, researchers have found that those 
who are strongly motivated to control for prejudice are less influenced 
by implicit racial stereotypes that result in shooting bias.236 
More directly relevant to this Article, other studies have 
demonstrated the important influence of training on reducing the 
impact of implicit racial bias on shooting decisions.237  In one set of 
experiments, E. Ashby Plant and B. Michelle Peruche found that 
 
233 Id. at 1226. 
234 Joshua Correll et al., The Influence of Stereotypes on Decisions to Shoot, 37 EUR. J. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1102, 1107 (2007) (“[R]einforcing or undermining racial stereotypes that 
link Blacks to danger and crime can dramatically affect the magnitude of racial bias in the 
decision to shoot.”). 
235 Id. at 1111 (“[M]anipulations designed to increase the accessibility of the Black-
danger association exacerbate bias in the decision to shoot.”). 
236 Glaser & Knowles, supra note 190, at 169–70. 
237 As Saaid Mendoza, Peter Gollwitzer, and David Amodio recently summarized, 
“Expressions of racial bias are believed to comprise both automatic and controlled 
components, and either component may be targeted by strategies that aim to reduce the 
behavioral expression of implicit stereotypes.”  Saaid A. Mendoza et al., Reducing the 
Expression of Implicit Stereotypes: Reflexive Control Through Implementation Intentions, 
36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 512, 512 (2010) (internal citation omitted).  
Rather than focusing on trying to “directly alter latent forms of bias built up during the 
course of a lifetime,” the researchers demonstrated the promise of reflexive engagement of 
control in reducing implicit bias effects.  Id. at 520.  More specifically, they documented 
“that a distraction-inhibiting implementation intention, which instructed participants to 
ignore the targets’ race, . . . [and] a response-facilitating implementation intention, which 
focused participants on task-relevant shoot/don’t shoot actions in response to critical 
stimuli (i.e., guns vs. benign objects), [both] led to an increase in controlled processing      
. . . .”  Id. 
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although members of the public and police officers were initially 
more likely to shoot unarmed black suspects than unarmed white 
suspects, with extensive practice on a shooter simulation program, 
both populations were able to eliminate this bias.238 
More recent work by Correll and his coauthors has strongly 
bolstered the argument for training as a critical tool for avoiding 
racially biased firearm use; but, unlike Plant and Peruche, the 
researchers did not find that police officers demonstrated significant 
evidence of bias in their shooting decisions even at the outset of 
testing (they did find such bias for community members).239  This 
difference appears to stem from the fact that the stimuli used by 
Correll and his collaborators “more closely mirror[ed] police training 
(e.g., Firearms Training System or firing range encounters) and on-
the-job experiences” than the more basic stimuli employed by Plant 
and Peruche.240  As a result, officers’ previous training and 
experiences likely generalized to the Correll team’s shooting task 
(and prepared officers to control for implicit biases from the very 
beginning of the experiment), whereas the Plant and Peruche task was 
more novel and did not implicate previous police training.241 
Without relevant simulation experience or work in the field, 
community participants in the Correll team’s study performed much 
worse than police officer participants: they were slower to make 
correct responses, were worse at detecting the presence of a weapon, 
and were far more “trigger-happy” (setting a much lower criterion for 
 
238 Plant & Peruche, The Consequences of Race, supra note 216, at 182 (police 
officers); E. Ashby Plant et al., Eliminating Automatic Racial Bias: Making Race Non-
Diagnostic for Responses to Criminal Suspects, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 
141.  As a result, they concluded that “exposure to the program, in which the race of the 
suspect was unrelated to the presence of a weapon, eliminated the racial bias.”  Plant & 
Peruche, supra note 216, at 182; Plant et al., supra (“The current work demonstrated the 
efficacy of a new approach to bias elimination that, as opposed to only exposing people to 
information that runs counter to the stereotype, exposed people to social stimuli where 
group membership (i.e., race) was statistically unrelated to the evaluated characteristic 
(i.e., being a violent criminal).”). 
239 See Correll et al., supra note 137, at 1021. 
240 Id. at 1021 (“Plant and Peruche presented Black and White male faces on which 
objects (e.g., a gun or wallet) had been superimposed.  Our stimuli involve full-body 
images of men holding guns and other objects.  These images are embedded in scenes, 
such as parks or cityscapes.”). 
241 See id.  Plant and Peruche readily acknowledge this limitation concerning their 
experimental design and the fact that “learning is often quite domain-specific.”  See Plant 
& Peruche, supra note 216, at 183. 
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the decision to shoot).242  Concerning race effects, members of the 
community sample showed 
a clear tendency to set a lower (i.e., more lenient or ‘trigger-happy’) 
criterion for Black, rather than White, targets.  But this bias was 
weaker, or even nonexistent, for the officers.  The reduction in bias 
seemed to reflect the fact that, compared with the community 
members, officers set a higher, more stringent threshold for the 
decision to shoot Black targets.243 
With white targets, officers and community members did not differ, 
and both set a relatively high criterion.244  Yet, although police 
officers showed negligible bias in their ultimate decisions to shoot, 
they were quite similar to members of the public in demonstrating 
robust racial bias with respect to the speed with which they made 
shooting decisions: “Accurate responses to targets congruent with 
culturally prevalent stereotypes (i.e., armed Black targets and 
unarmed White targets) required less time than did responses to 
stereotype-incongruent targets (i.e., unarmed Black targets and armed 
White targets).”245  Officers, just like the community sample, held 
implicit racial bias, but their training allowed them to override the 
automatic associations.  And, revealingly, when novice college 
students were trained on the shooter simulation, they too 
demonstrated “a significant decrease in racial bias, as measured by 
the decision criterion, accompanied by an increase in sensitivity.”246  
Practice meant that they started to perform more like officers.247 
 
242 See Correll et al., supra note 137, at 1020. 
243 See id. at 1015. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 1020 (despite showing racial bias in reaction time just like members of the 
public, officers were nonetheless faster overall in making correct responses).  In addition, 
“officers from urban, high-crime, predominantly minority districts (environments likely to 
reinforce stereotypes about Black people) showed greater racial bias in their latencies.”  Id. 
246 Id. 
247 When trained student participants returned for a second day of simulation (forty-
eight hours later), they again demonstrated racial bias initially, which Correll and his 
coauthors suggest is a result of the fact that the training they received was nowhere near as 
extensive as the training given to officers.  Id. at 1020–21 (arguing that more extensive 
training is required for more permanent effects).  Correll and his coauthors have begun 
data collection at a police academy and have found that, prior to receiving any weapons 
training, recruits “show statistically significant racial bias in both reaction times and in the 
decision criteria.”  Id. at 1021. 
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III 
IMPLICATIONS 
At the end of the day, this is really again a fundamental debate in 
terms of what is the problem in terms of violent crime.  Is the 
problem law abiding citizens who follow the law and take all the 
time and all the trouble needed to get conceal-and-carry permits?248 
    – Senator David Vitter 
     Republican from Louisiana 
The experimental evidence provided in the previous section offers 
an unexpected answer to what Senator Vitter must surely have 
supposed to be a rhetorical question.  The law-abiding gun owner who 
believes himself to harbor no prejudice against minorities may 
nonetheless pose a significant threat to black Americans. 
Implicit bias research suggests that large sectors of the population 
hold biases against minorities beyond their conscious awareness or 
control and that, in simulations, those individuals are more likely to 
shoot unarmed blacks than unarmed whites.249  Moreover, unlike 
police officers, regular citizens do not have the benefit of what 
appears to be the most promising tool for reducing racially biased 
shooting behavior: significant, ongoing firearm training.250 
A.  Police Officer Training v. Private Gun Owner Training 
Entering police recruits undergo extensive firearm training at the 
academy before they are allowed to carry a weapon as an officer.  The 
Denver Police Department, for instance, mandates that recruits 
receive eighty-eight hours of practical weapons training.251  After 
that, officers are required to recertify each quarter through 
marksmanship and decisional shooting handgun qualifications.252  
The training is rigorous: 
At the firing range, officers and recruits make shoot/don’t-shoot 
decisions for target silhouettes that appear suddenly, either armed or 
unarmed; in Firearms Training System simulators (Firearms 
Training Systems, Inc., Atlanta, GA), they respond to an interactive 
 
248 Bernie Becker & David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Rejects Gun Rights Bill, 
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, July 23, 2009, at A1 (quoting Senator David Vitter). 
249 See supra text accompanying notes 216–26. 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 237–47. 
251 See Training Bureau, Firearms Training, DENVER GOV., http://www.denvergov.org 
/FirearmsTraining/tabid/395385/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
252 See id. 
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video simulation of a potentially hostile suspect; and in simulated 
searches, they confront live actors armed with weapons that fire 
painful but nonlethal ammunition (e.g., paintballs, Simunition, or 
Air Soft pellets).253 
In New York, police recruits complete five days of basic training 
(learning firearms safety and shooting fundamentals, among other 
things) and then, after passing two of three “Pistol Qualification 
Courses,” they have a seven-day training on making sound tactical 
decisions, firing a total of 1200 live fire rounds.254  Twice a year, they 
must then re-qualify by attending lectures (on topics like “the 
judicious use of the firearm” and “tactics to mitigate [reflexive 
responses]”) and completing live fire and simulations using the 
Firearms Training Simulator (FATS).255  Although some other 
jurisdictions are less rigorous in applying the latest marksmanship and 
decisional shooting technologies, many do utilize FATS.256  Overall, 
as the studies investigated in Part II document, these training 
experiences likely help officers to avoid the snap judgments in 
shooting decisions that often reflect implicit racial bias. 
Private citizen gun owners receive no comparable training benefits.  
In the majority of states, the only requirement to purchase a handgun 
is passing a NICS background check.257  Of the few states that 
impose additional requirements to purchase a handgun, only 
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New York, and 
Rhode Island require proof of some sort of safety training prior to 
purchase—none of which includes the type of shoot/don’t shoot 
simulation practice that appears to be effective in counteracting the 
influence of implicit bias.258 
 
253 Correll et al., supra note 137, at 1007. 
254 Training Bureau, Firearms and Tactics Section, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/training_nypd/firearm_tatics.shtml (last visited Oct. 
10, 2010). 
255 See id. 
256 See, e.g., Police Academy, PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.phillypolice.com 
/careers/police-academy/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
257 NAT. RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION (NRA-ILA), COMPENDIUM OF 
STATE LAWS GOVERNING FIREARMS (2010) [hereinafter NRA-ILA COMPENDIUM], 
available at http://www.nraila.org/media/PDFs/Compendium.pdf. 
258 Id. at n.11.  The training requirements vary from state to state.  For example, 
Michigan requires an applicant to answer seventy percent of questions correctly on a Basic 
Pistol Safety Questionnaire.  Purchasing and Registering a Pistol in Michigan, MICH. 
STATE POLICE, http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,1607,7-123-1591_3503_4654-225113      
--,00.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).  In contrast, Maryland requires a safety-training 
course that, as of July 1, 2009, can be completed online in approximately thirty minutes.  
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One might expect a significantly more rigorous regulatory 
approach to licensing those who wish to carry a concealed weapon 
because such individuals are likely to bring firearms into more public 
settings.  Yet, despite Senator Vitter’s comment about “all the time 
and all the trouble needed to get conceal-and-carry permits,”259 in 
nearly all jurisdictions, as detailed in the fifty-state chart in Appendix 
A, the requirements are actually quite minimal.260 
In order to carry a concealed handgun, individuals must obtain a 
permit, except in (1) Wisconsin and Illinois, where concealed carry is 
completely prohibited, and (2) Vermont, Arizona, and Alaska, where 
no license is required to carry a gun.261  Thirty-four states have “shall 
issue” concealed carry laws, which establish that, as long as an 
individual meets the requirements for a permit set by the state 
legislature, a permit applicant shall receive such a permit and the 
issuing body has no discretionary power in the decision.262  While the 
requirements to obtain a permit vary, most states require some form 
of handgun competency training (only Alabama, Georgia, 
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South 
Dakota do not).263  However, no state requires the type of training 
that might counteract the influence of implicit bias. 
New Mexico, for example, has among the most rigorous permitting 
requirements in the country, including the completion of an initial 
firearms training course of not less than fifteen hours in length and 
two-hour refresher training courses every two years after the issuance 
 
Firearms Safety Training, MD. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., 
http://www.mdgunsafety.com/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).  In fact, by statute, no safety-
training course offered by the Maryland Police Training Commission can last over two 
hours.  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-208(d)(2) (West 2010). 
259 See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
260 That said, there are a few exceptions, such as Maryland and New Jersey, where to 
obtain a carry permit an individual must document a clear need for a weapon. 
 The requirements to carry a handgun in plain sight (open carry) also vary by state.  For 
example, while eleven states allow open carry of a loaded handgun on foot or in a vehicle 
without requiring any license, seven states either completely ban or highly restrict the 
practice.  Open Carry of a Loaded Handgun, OPENCARRY.ORG, http://www.opencarry.org 
/opencarry.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
261 See infra app. A.  Alaska and Arizona also maintain permit to carry regulations for 
the sake of reciprocity with other states.  See NRA-ILA COMPENDIUM, supra note 257 at 
n.16. 
262 See infra app. A.; see also Right-to-Carry 2010, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION, http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=18 (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
263 See infra app. A. 
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of the original license.264  But the specifics of the training—
instruction on the safe handling, storage, and shooting of handguns; 
live shooting at a firing range; identification of ways to further 
develop shooting skills; education on weapons laws; and instruction 
on techniques for avoiding criminal attacks and for nonviolent dispute 
resolution—reveal nothing likely to help control for implicit racial 
bias.265  What is more, most states require far less than New 
Mexico.266  In Massachusetts, for example, the “NRA Home 
[Firearm] Safety Course,” a four-hour non-shooting course taught 
only in the classroom, will satisfy the training requirement for a 
permit to carry a concealed handgun.267  Although other state-
approved NRA offerings, like the “NRA Basic Pistol Shooting 
Course,” are longer and include practice at a range, the focus at the 
range is not on decisional shooting; it is on properly handling and 
loading the weapon, following the rules of the range, and shooting 
from various positions, among other things.268 
Based on the research investigated in Part II, one of the other major 
limitations of existing state training requirements is that they tend to 
come into effect only once, prior to a firearm purchase.  Indeed, 
concealed carry permits are generally valid for between one and five 
years, and in many states renewing a permit does not require any new 
training or testing.269  Under the circumstances, any implicit bias 
control benefits gained from the initial training are likely to dissipate, 
just as they did for those given brief practice in the “shoot/don’t 
shoot” experiments who returned later for additional simulations.270  
As Correll and his colleagues explained, “[M]ore extensive training is 
 
264 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-19-6, 29-19-7 (West 2009). 
265 Id. § 29-19-7. 
266 See infra app. A. 
267 Approved Basic Firearms Safety Courses, MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF PUB. SAFETY & 
SEC., http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=eopsterminal&L=2&L0=Home&L1=Firearms 
+Registration+%26+Laws&sid=Eeops&b=terminalcontent&f=msp_firearmsmsp_firearms
_approved_basic_firearms_safety_courses&csid=Eeops (last visited Oct. 10, 2010); see 
also MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 140, § 131P (West 2009).  In the course, “[s]tudents are 
taught NRA’s three rules for safe gun handling; primary causes of firearms accidents; 
firearm parts; how to unload certain action types; ammunition components; cleaning; care; 
safe storage of firearms in the home; and the benefits of becoming an active participant in 
the shooting sports.”  Course Catalog, NRA INSTRUCTORS, http://www.nrainstructors.org 
/CourseCatalog.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
268 Course Catalog, supra note 267. 
269 See infra app. A. 
270 See Correll et al., supra note 137, at 1020–21. 
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necessary if participants are to more permanently overcome bias in 
behavioral responses.”271 
B.  The Training Deficiency in Context 
The danger to black citizens stems not only from the fact that most 
Americans carry implicit racial biases and that these biases can 
impact the shooting behavior of those who lack proper training but 
also from the fact that the use of guns is actually quite prevalent.  As 
described in Part I.A, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of 
Americans use guns in purported self-defense contexts each year.272  
Inevitably, many of these incidents take place under ambiguous 
circumstances or require split-second decision making: A woman is 
awakened in the night to see someone climbing over a back fence 
carrying what seems to be a handgun.  A man thinks he sees a knife in 
a bar fight.  A woman comes across a robbery in progress in which 
the perpetrator is holding a dark object.  In these scenarios and 
countless others, automatic unconscious associations may largely 
determine how we act. 
Moreover, blacks appear more likely than whites to come into 
contact with gun owners in exactly these types of problematic 
situations where the gun owner may feel threatened and have a 
weapon at hand.  For example, according to a 2004 Department of 
Justice survey, “Non-Hispanic blacks comprised more than half of the 
defendants charged with robbery (56%).”273  Blacks are also 
“statistically three times more likely to commit a burglary than a non-
black”274—a disparity with particularly grave consequences given 
that armed homeowners confront burglars half a million times each 
year.275  By contrast, blacks are far less likely to commit certain 
crimes—like bribery, fraud, and counterfeiting—that do not normally 
involve immediately threatening contact with individuals who may be 
toting weapons.276  If we are committed to basic fairness, equal 
 
271 Id. at 1020. 
272 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
273 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN 
LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2004, at 2 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs 
/pub/pdf/fdluc04.pdf. 
274 Geoffrey R. Stone, Race and Reason, HUFFINGTON POST, July 26, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/race-and-reason_b_245143.html. 
275 See Robin M. Ikeda et al., supra note 88. 
276 CYNTHIA BARNETT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, THE MEASUREMENT OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME USING UNIFORM CRIME 
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treatment, and due process—as we purport to be—it is no response to 
suggest that those unarmed African Americans who were shot while 
committing burglaries simply got what was coming to them.  Even 
granting that we might want to punish burglary more severely than 
fraud or embezzlement, if blacks are killed when they are caught 
stealing and whites end up in the back of a squad car, that is reason 
for alarm.277 
That said, it is critical to understand that implicit racial bias 
endangers both innocent blacks and those who are perpetrating 
crimes.  There are countless opportunities for African Americans to 
be confronted with firearms based on completely innocent conduct.  
Indeed, part of the reason that black police officers are at a greater 
risk of being assaulted with a firearm than white police officers may 
be shooter bias.278  This was precisely the conclusion of a recent New 
York state task force investigating the causes of mistaken-identity 
shootings of police officers: “[R]ace can, and often does, play a 
significant role in these [mistaken-identity] confrontations—at least in 
the escalation of these confrontations into fatal tragedies.”279 
Based purely on numbers, the overall threat to minorities appears 
to be far greater than the bigoted attacks that have received so much 
attention from the press in recent months and years.280  In 2008, for 
example, there was only one murder recorded in the United States 
motivated by anti-black bias, and there were 386 aggravated 
assaults.281  Putting this in context, it is estimated that approximately 
 
REPORTING (UCR) DATA 5 (1999), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/whitecollar 
forweb.pdf (reporting that 84.9% of bribery incidents, 70.6% of fraud incidents, and 
75.8% of counterfeiting incidents were committed by white offenders). 
277 Cf. Eberhardt et al., supra note 204, at 385 (documenting that the stereotypicality of 
black defendants predicts the likelihood that they will be sentenced to death in cases 
involving white victims). 
278 See Table 27, Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed: Type of Weapon, 1997–
2006, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/table27.html 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
279 N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON POLICE-ON-POLICE SHOOTINGS, REDUCING INHERENT 
DANGER: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON POLICE-ON-POLICE SHOOTINGS 39 (2010) 
[hereinafter N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE], available at http://www.state.ny.us/governor 
/reports/pdf/Police_on_Police.pdf; see also id. at iii (“As far as we can determine, 1982 
was the last year in which an off-duty, white police officer was killed in a mistaken-
identity, police-on-police shooting anywhere in the United States.”). 
280 See supra notes 90–91, 119–20 and accompanying text. 
281 2008 Hate Crime Statistics, Table 4, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2008), 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2008/data/table_12.html.  In total, there were 3413 hate crime 
offenses referencing anti-black bias recorded in 2008, more than two-thirds of which were 
either intimidation or destruction/damage/vandalism.  Id. 
 2010] Quick on the Draw 55 
a million people were wounded or killed by guns in the last ten 
years282 and that over fifty percent of those people were black.283  Of 
course, many of these shootings may not have been significantly 
influenced by implicit racial bias against African Americans, but even 
with an extremely conservative estimate, assuming, arguendo, that 
ninety-eight or ninety-nine percent of shootings of blacks were 
completely free from any implicit bias effect (an estimate that seems 
unrealistically high in light of the evidence of the pervasiveness of 
implicit bias in the U.S. population and its impact on behavior), that 
would mean that race affected the shooting of five to ten thousand 
blacks in the last decade.  As damaging as they are, hate crimes are 
both rare and generally nonlethal.  By contrast, when implicit bias 
influences shooting behavior, the result is frequently a life-or-death 
scenario. 
What is more, the impact of shooter bias is likely to be getting 
worse because, as documented in Part I.A, more people are buying 
guns.284  And, just as important, people have greater rights to firearm 
possession in a variety of contexts as a result of changes in the law.285  
Heller and McDonald ensured that Americans may keep handguns in 
their homes for self-defense.286  New legislation has allowed guns to 
be legally brought into various environments where they were 
previously prohibited: national parks, churches, bars, and trains, to 
name just a few.287  And it is not only that the law has changed but 
also that carrying weapons into public settings has become more 
socially acceptable.288  More Americans are likely to have more guns 
in more different interactions than ever before, which means more 
opportunities for implicit bias to impact shooting decisions.  The 
aftershocks may be felt particularly strongly in major cities, which 
 
282 Brief of Amici Curiae Brady Center, supra note 41, at 11; see also WISQARS 
Nonfatal Injury Reports, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates2001 
.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010); WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports, 1999–2007, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_sy.html (last visited Oct. 
10, 2010). 
283 ZAWITZ & STROM, supra note 90. 
284 See supra text accompanying notes 81–83. 
285 See supra text accompanying notes 41–44, 47–55. 
286 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008); McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). 
287 See supra text accompanying notes 47–53. 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 67–69. 
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both had the most stringent gun restrictions prior to Heller and 
McDonald and have the largest concentrations of minority citizens.289  
In the coming years in such urban areas, shooter bias may have a 
particularly devastating effect on blacks.  And the fact that many 
neighborhoods in big cities continue to be racially segregated may 
prove to be less of a protection than might be imagined given the 
evidence that both blacks and whites exhibit equivalent levels of 
shooter bias against African Americans.290 
Finally, “make-my-day” self-defense laws may be altering the 
shooting decision itself in a way that makes implicit bias more of a 
threat.291  The more permissive legal regime removes a check on 
pulling the trigger and encourages automaticity.  Experiencing any 
threat?  Shoot first and ask questions later.  Under such 
circumstances, blacks are particularly at risk because interrupting the 
pathway between the split-second judgment of dangerousness based 
on race and the decision to fire is already an uphill battle. 
Overall, the United States appears to be in the midst of a transfer of 
power from professional state law enforcement to amateur private 
citizen law enforcement.292  Armed private citizens are increasingly 
tasked as our peace keepers—our first line of defense against 
criminals in our cities.  Yet, a lack of training leaves them unprepared 
to take on this role, seriously endangering our minority population.293  
And, in an ironic twist, as private citizens are empowered, the 
professional state law enforcement officers whom they supplement or 
replace may be the ones who are most at risk, particularly black 
 
289 For example, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and New York—three of the cities with 
the most restrictive firearms laws prior to Heller—are home to over 3.5 million African 
Americans (blacks make up 60.0%, 36.8%, and 26.6% of each city’s respective total 
population).  JESSE MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000 at 
7 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-5.pdf. 
290 See Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma, supra note 216, at 1324. 
291 See supra text accompanying notes 70–72. 
292 See supra text accompanying notes 92–101. 
293 It is worth pointing out that having private citizens making shooting decisions rather 
than police officers is problematic not only because police officers benefit from far greater 
training that may help reduce the impact of implicit biases, but also because there are 
numerous other checks on officers using guns.  There are mechanisms to prevent members 
of the police from working when they are intoxicated, on drugs, suffering from lack of 
sleep, or experiencing age-related decreases in cognitive functioning, among other things, 
all of which may impact shoot/don’t shoot decision making.  Private citizens, by contrast, 
face no similar prohibitions.  To purchase a gun, a person does not even have to pass an 
eye test.  See Kolpack, supra note 183. 
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undercover and off-duty police officers.294  With members of the 
public increasingly carrying weapons into public spaces and 
encouraged to use them for protection, it is likely to be very 
dangerous for nonuniformed black officers to draw their weapons, 
even when responding to emergency situations. 
IV 
A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
An association should be organized . . . to promote and encourage 
rifle shooting on a scientific basis.295 
  – William Conant Church 
  Co-founder of the National Rifle Association 
Accepting the seriousness of the problem of implicit racial bias 
influencing shooting behavior in an increasingly pro-firearm 
environment, it would, nonetheless, seem difficult if not impossible to 
implement any meaningful reforms to address it.  However, a 
realistic, practical policy prescription does exist.  In particular, this 
Article argues that states ought to enact requirements that gun owners 
enroll in ongoing firearm training. 
A.  New Firearm Training Requirements 
In contrast to most existing regulations, the new proposed licensing 
requirements would make training mandatory for anyone seeking to 
own a firearm.  In moving to a mandatory regime, states might elect 
to require greater training for individuals seeking to carry their 
weapons in public, but a baseline would be set for all gun owners. 
In addition, unlike current firearm training courses—whose 
emphasis is solely on educating students about gun laws; safe storage; 
weapon cleaning, loading, and firing; and other issues—new 
regulations would mandate firearm-simulation training and shooting 
practice aimed directly at reducing the impact of implicit bias.296  
 
294 Since 2004, off-duty officers have been authorized to carry their weapons with them 
anywhere in the country.  N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 279, at 108. 
295 JAMES B. TREFETHEN, AMERICANS AND THEIR GUNS 34 (1967) (quoting William 
Conant Church, 1871). 
296 To the extent that other proposals to improve current licensing regimes have 
mentioned training, they have involved reforms unlikely to address the problems 
highlighted in this Article and have largely focused on gaining wider acceptance for 
conventional training requirements already adopted in certain states.  The Legal 
Community Against Violence, for example, has argued for “safety training,” “hands-on 
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Although necessarily less extensive, this would mirror the substance 
of the existing training that law enforcement officers receive in some 
jurisdictions.  Just like officers in New York and elsewhere, prior to 
being allowed to possess a gun in public, private citizens would be 
required to practice their accuracy in simulated encounters and to 
work to reduce their error rates.297  And, like officers, they would be 
required to recertify by periodically retraining.  Certain states might 
elect to waive recertification training in instances where gun owners 
provided documentation of a certain number of hours of approved 
decisional shooter practice during the licensed period. 
Initially, citizen training regimes might make use of existing 
technologies and programs used to train police officers, but over time, 
simulations could be specifically designed to be even more effective 
in reducing racially biased shooting behavior by members of the 
public.  This would involve, among other things, creating simulations 
that (1) are increasingly realistic, (2) model the exact interactions in 
which private citizens are most likely to use their weapons (e.g., home 
burglaries or robberies), and (3) ensure that the race of suspects is 
unrelated to the presence of weapons.  The success of such programs 
would depend, in part, on continued research on debiasing and data 
collection on shooter bias, which would allow state and local 
governments to hone the details of training requirements to minimize 
the costs to gun owners and the general public and to maximize 
effectiveness.298 
 
testing, including firing testing, to demonstrate safe use of firearms,” and “written testing 
to demonstrate knowledge of applicable firearm laws.”  LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST 
VIOLENCE, supra note 181, at 186. 
297 Individual states could determine whether or not to require an exam following 
training.  If states are able to constitutionally bar individuals from owning a gun based on 
failing a written safety exam, barring individuals based on their performance on a realistic 
shooting simulation seems legally unproblematic.  And, from a purely public safety 
perspective, it would make sense that any individual unable to control for implicit racial 
bias after extensive training would be disqualified from owning a weapon, just as it makes 
sense to bar someone convicted of a violent felony from owning a firearm.  However, this 
Article does not champion such an approach at this time.  Politically, including such a bar 
is likely to be controversial and the benefits in terms of controlling for implicit bias might 
be largely realized by requiring extensive training without a final exam.  In addition, 
because such an approach has the potential to completely prevent an individual from 
enjoying gun ownership (in contrast to the minor resource commitment involved in 
completing new training), it seems prudent to wait to act until more data are collected and 
our understanding of shooter bias is further developed. 
298 This Article does not advocate collecting individualized data on shooter bias, but 
anonymous collection like that completed in earlier shooter studies is likely to yield 
valuable insights without endangering any privacy rights.  With ongoing implicit bias 
research, other educational components outside of decisional shooting practice might be 
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In turn, this research and experience could help to reshape police 
academy practices and ongoing officer training.  Not all police 
departments require the same degree of rigor in their shooting 
simulations, and few if any have programs specifically designed to 
address implicit bias.299  Advances in private citizen debiasing could 
yield significant benefits to state and local governments eager to 
reduce the number of innocent minorities shot by police officers.  
Indeed, New York has already recognized the need to address 
unconscious racial bias through systematic research on the shooting 
decision making of officers and the development of interactive 
training that “continue[s] throughout an officer’s career and across all 
ranks.”300  It is likely that an enriched understanding of shooter bias 
could also be greatly beneficial to the U.S. military, given the need to 
reduce friendly fire and civilian deaths.301 
B.  Eight Reasons That New Training Requirements Are Feasible 
New training requirements are less likely to be met with strong 
opposition and less likely to result in negative side effects than other 
proposals aimed at protecting minority citizens from racially biased 
gun use. 
First, new training mandates are unlikely to run into serious 
constitutional issues.  The Supreme Court made clear in Heller and 
McDonald that nothing in the opinion was meant to qualify the right 
of the government to “impos[e] conditions and qualifications on the 
 
added to further improve accuracy and speed in decision making.  See, e.g., Glaser & 
Knowles, supra note 190, at 171. 
299 See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 279, at 51 (“Most officers nationwide 
undergo mandatory firearms requalification to demonstrate proficiency with firearms 
safety and to practice how to shoot, but not enough training is geared toward making the 
shoot/don’t shoot decision and to handling the difficult and dangerous situations that many 
officers inevitably encounter.”). 
300 Id. at 56.  In 2010, the New York State task force empanelled by Governor David A. 
Paterson to study mistaken-identity shootings of officers recommended “that both federal 
and state governments accelerate the development and training to measurably reduce 
unconscious racial bias in shoot/don’t shoot decisions.”  Id. at iv.  As a result, Correll and 
his colleagues have been testing NYPD police recruits for implicit racial bias in 
shoot/don’t shoot decisions at admission, at the completion of training, and after entering 
the field.  Id. at 40.  The hope is that this will shed further light on the impact of police 
training on shooting decision making, such that the NYPD will be able to identify the 
optimal amount and intensity of training aimed at reducing racial bias in officers.  Id. 
301 Fleming et al., supra note 226, at 202 (“[U]nderstanding the mechanisms underlying 
the decision to shoot can lead to better training protocols for military personnel and fewer 
casualties due to misidentification of threat or friendly fire.”). 
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commercial sale of arms.”302  As Dennis Henigan has noted, this is “a 
category broad enough to include background checks, waiting 
periods, licensing, registration, safety training, limits on large-volume 
sales, etc.”303  Although the Supreme Court may offer further 
clarification in the future, a majority of Justices appear to be 
convinced that there is a broad set of gun control regulations that 
remain presumptively lawful.304 
Moreover, of any gun ownership requirements, training provisions 
seem particularly unlikely to be successfully challenged.  As Adam 
Winkler has explained, “No mainstream scholar of the Second 
Amendment denies that government must have the authority to adopt 
legislation . . . requiring education and training . . . .”305  Even those 
scholars who have argued for an individual-rights interpretation of the 
Second Amendment, and taken a very limited view of the meaning of 
“well regulated” in the text, grant that the Amendment’s language 
referred to a militia “that was well-trained and equipped.”306  And, in 
fact, this is the understanding articulated by the majority in Heller: 
“[T]he adjective ‘well-regulated’ implies nothing more than the 
imposition of proper discipline and training.”307  It seems unlikely 
that requiring shooter training would be viewed as anything other than 
a reasonable exercise of state “police powers to legislate as to the 
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all 
persons.”308 
 
302 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008); McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010). 
303 Henigan, supra note 174, at 1195. 
304 See Cook et al., supra note 80, at 1059–60 (2009) (“One can easily imagine the 5-4 
vote [in Heller] going the other way had the District permitted a law-abiding citizen to 
store one handgun in the home, but required handgun training, registration, and a trigger 
lock—except when and if self-defense became necessary.”); Henigan, supra note 174, at 
1197 (“The language strongly indicates that one or more of the Justices in the [Heller] 
majority were willing to join Scalia's opinion only if it allowed substantial continued 
deference to legislative decisionmaking on gun policy.”). 
305 Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 707 
(2007). 
306 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. 
REV. 461, 474 (1995); see also, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The 
New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1208 (1996) (“The 
eighteenth century usage of ‘regulate’ had the more specialized meaning of ‘practiced in 
the use of arms, properly trained, and/or disciplined.’” (citing Robert Dowlut, The Right to 
Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 
92 n.133 (1983)). 
307 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2800. 
308 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The training requirements proposed in this Article apply equally to 
everyone and do not allow for unbridled discretion based on vague 
standards like some licensing regimes.309  Nor do they deny anyone 
the right to possess a firearm.310  They are merely a reasonable 
safeguard, grounded in empirical evidence, to protect particularly 
vulnerable members of the public.  And they seem to have ready 
analogies with respect to other state and federal licenses.  You may 
have a right to a gun, but you must be trained in how to use it, just as 
you must be trained before you are allowed to operate a plane, crane, 
or semi.311  It makes little sense that a police officer should have to 
undergo training to be allowed to carry a gun, but private citizens 
should not.  Under the proposed state provisions, private citizens 
would not be asked to do anything more than what our trusted law 
enforcement officers already do—and, in fact, with respect to time 
commitment, they would be asked to do much less.  The only 
alteration to the regulatory landscape that the new training codes 
would create would be to even the playing field so that everyone who 
chooses to carry a weapon is treated equally. 
Second, a robust training regime is far less likely to be attacked by 
the NRA than proposals for other restrictions or qualifications on 
purchasing weapons.  For one thing, by removing the viability of a 
general gun ban, Heller has eliminated the slippery slope argument 
that licensing and registration regimes are likely to lead to firearm 
prohibition—a proven strategy for the NRA in the past.312  
Furthermore, as the above quotation by William Conant Church 
suggests, the association’s history references a strong commitment to 
improving shooter accuracy grounded in “science”—and the best 
science today on implicit bias suggests that, to reduce incidents of 
shooter error, individuals need greater firearm schooling.  This does 
not conflict with the NRA’s stated goals; it aligns with them: “[T]he 
NRA has, since its inception, been the premier firearms education 
organization in the world.”313  The New York charter granted to the 
 
309 See Winkler, supra note 305, at 722. 
310 Id. at 723. 
311 See, e.g., Pilot Training, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/pilots 
/training/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2010); State Licensing Requirements, NAT’L COMM’N FOR 
THE CERTIFICATION OF CRANE OPERATORS (NCCCO), http://www.nccco.org/licensing 
/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
312 Henigan, supra note 174, at 1208. 
313 A Brief History of the NRA, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N HEADQUARTERS, 
http://www.nrahq.org/history.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
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National Rifle Association in 1871 provided that the purpose of the 
organization was “to promote rifle practice, and for this purpose to 
provide a suitable range or ranges in the vicinity of New York . . . and 
to promote the introduction of a system of aiming drill and target 
firing among the National Guard of New York and the militia of other 
states.”314  Since 1960, the NRA has been the only national trainer of 
law enforcement officers, and there are currently more than 11,000 
NRA-certified police and security firearms instructors.315  The NRA 
also already trains members of the public, with over 50,000 certified 
instructors training approximately 750,000 firearms owners each 
year.316  Thus, the stage is already set for the mandatory training 
reforms suggested above, which embody the NRA’s commitment to 
instruction on “safe, effective, firearm handling.”317 
Third, even if the NRA opposed new state training legislation, it 
does not follow that increased training requirements would be too 
unpalatable to gun owners to be politically feasible.  Recent survey 
data suggest that most gun owners are actually quite a bit more 
moderate than NRA rhetoric would suggest when it comes to gun 
controls.318  Indeed, eighty-two percent of NRA members are in favor 
of prohibiting suspected terrorists from buying guns, sixty-nine 
percent are in favor of background checks for all gun show sales, and 
seventy-eight percent are in favor of requiring gun owners to report 
lost and stolen guns.319  Most critical to this Article, the majority of 
NRA members support requiring those purchasing firearms to 
undergo mandatory safety training.320  These numbers suggest that 
many gun owners are not the single-minded zealots that lobbyists and 
politicians conjure up.  They do not blindly adhere to the maxim that 
“Americans should not have their Second Amendment rights 
 
314 TREFETHEN, supra note 295, at 10. 
315 Law Enforcement Training, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N HEADQUARTERS, 
http://www.nrahq.org/law/training/training.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
316 A Brief History of the NRA, supra note 313. 
317 Law Enforcement Training, supra note 315. 
318 Editorial, Gun Owners, Unfiltered, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/opinion/21mon4.html. 
319 MAIG Press Release: New Poll By Frank Luntz Shows NRA-Members and Other 
Gun Owners Support Sensible Measures to Keep Guns Out of the Hands of Criminals, 
MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.mayorsagainstillegal 
guns.org/html/media-center/pr012-09.shtml (the percentages are considerably higher for 
non-NRA member gun owners). 
320 See Douglas S. Weil & David Hemenway, I Am the NRA: An Analysis of a National 
Random Sample of Gun Owners, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 353, 361 (1993). 
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restricted for any reason,”321 as Senator Roger Wicker has suggested.  
Such proclamations make for powerful sound bites and foolish policy.  
Most American gun owners care about preserving their freedoms as 
law-abiding citizens to possess guns and about ensuring a safe 
society. 
Fourth, gun training is not onerous like some other types of 
training that are required for licensing.  Even without formal 
requirements, many gun owners voluntarily practice their shooting for 
recreation;322 indeed, they find going to the range fun.  Further, it is 
worth noting that firearm simulations are already incredibly popular 
as a means of entertainment.  In recent years, first-person shooter 
video games have become ubiquitous and remain among the top 
sellers.323  Thus, a training requirement is unlikely to force gun 
owners to significantly alter their routines and caters to existing 
preferences.  And with more research in the future, it might be 
possible to reduce existing training requirements that do not appear to 
have meaningful safety benefits such that total mandatory training is 
kept to a minimum.324 
Fifth, and related, the proposed training requirements would not 
necessitate any major alterations to present institutions or structures, 
and they are unlikely to be prohibitively expensive to implement.  
Although new courses would need to be developed over time to better 
reflect advances in debiasing science, as discussed previously, trainers 
and ranges already exist.  Just as important, companies are already 
producing the shooter simulation technology, which is sold to police 
departments around the country.325  No new industry would need to 
 
321 Editorial, The Senate Brandishes a Gun at Amtrak, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/opinion/18fri3.html (quoting Senator Roger Wicker, 
a Republican from Mississippi). 
322 Note, however, that normal target practice at a range is unlikely to yield benefits 
with respect to reducing the impact of implicit racial bias. 
323 Frank Cifaldi, Analysts: FPS “Most Attractive” Genre for Publishers, GAMASUTRA 
(Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.gamasutra.com/php-bin/news_index.php?story=8241. 
324 Some existing research, for example, suggests that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, 
conventional firearms training on safe gun handling and storage does not appear to have 
any effect on whether individuals keep guns loaded.  See Andrew J. McClurg, The Public 
Health Case for the Safe Storage of Firearms: Adolescent Suicides Add One More 
“Smoking Gun,” 51 HASTINGS L.J. 953, 987 (2000) (citing Douglas S. Weil & David 
Hemenway, Loaded Guns in the Home: Analysis of a National Random Survey of Gun 
Owners, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3033, 3035 (1992)). 
325 One of the main leaders is Meggitt Training Systems, which sells “virtual training 
capabilities and live fire training systems” to “law enforcement and security agencies 
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be created, and many products could simply be repurposed.326  
Although purchasing simulation equipment sufficient to cover all gun 
owners would entail costs, jurisdictions could reasonably pass off 
much of the expense to those seeking licenses, as many of these 
people have already shown themselves willing to spend money on 
practicing at firing ranges (not to mention on playing paintball and 
first-person shooter video games, among other similar activities).  For 
example, a two-hour beginner firearms training class at LAX Firing 
Range in Los Angeles costs $99.00, and normal range fees are $18.00 
if you bring your own ammunition and weapon.327  If passing off the 
cost to gun owners turned out to be politically infeasible, jurisdictions 
could opt for more basic and less costly technologies.  The computer-
based shooter simulation used by Correll and his colleagues is 
available for free on the Internet; and although training on it is less 
likely to generalize to actual shooter scenarios faced by members of 
the public than more advanced and realistic simulations, it may still 
prove to be effective as a debiasing tool.328  Alternatively, state or 
local governments might reasonably elect to subsidize the costs on 
public safety grounds much as they do for motorcycle training in 
many jurisdictions.329  Indeed, the outlays for new firearm simulation 
equipment might be largely offset by reduced emergency responder, 
medical, and other costs currently arising from preventable race-
implicated shootings. 
Sixth, meaningful firearm training and recertification is likely to 
bring benefits to society in addition to reducing the threat to African 
Americans.  As the various shooter bias studies document, training 
 
around the world.”  About Meggitt Training Systems, MEGGITT TRAINING SYS., 
http://www.meggitttrainingsystems.com/main.php?id=66 (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
326 Indeed, some police departments have already allowed members of the public to 
utilize their firearms simulators.  See, e.g., Jim McKay, Firearms Simulator Helps Police 
Prepare for Crisis Situations, GOV’T TECH. (Aug. 10, 2008), http://www.govtech.com 
/public-safety/102478594.html (discussing Ulster County, New York’s new citizens’ 
police academy); Citizens Police Academy Registration Open, S. BRUNSWICK POLICE 
DEP’T (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.twp.south-brunswick.nj.us/index.asp?Type=B_PR 
&SEC={632BF4B0-3CDB-402A-A487-625F58FEED45}&DE={31A5AB55-35AC-4AD 
B-BE49-2E59019CAB6A} (offering a free twelve-week course to citizens, including 
training with a Firearms Training Systems simulator). 
327 Price List, LAX FIRING RANGE, http://www.laxrange.com/pricelist.shtm (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2010). 
328 This, again, shows the need for continued rigorous study of shooter bias. 
329 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, PA. MOTORCYCLE RIDER EDUC. 
http://pmre.net/FAQs.htm#1 (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (offering half-price subsidy from 
the State of Washington). 
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not only minimizes shooting errors relating to firing on unarmed 
blacks but also improves accuracy more generally.330  It also 
increases the speed of correct decision making.331  Reform efforts 
could, thus, be framed in race-neutral ways, which might make new 
training requirements more politically plausible.  Cast in such a light, 
the purpose of the new regulations would be to reduce error rates 
across the board in the interests of public safety.  The idea would be 
that new training requirements would help to protect both innocent 
would-be-shooter victims and innocent gun owners.  As Correll and 
his coauthors’ work highlights, unconscious biases may result not 
only in shooting harmless, unarmed individuals but also in not 
shooting dangerous, armed individuals.332  Hence, a new training 
regime could be accurately framed as a necessary step in ensuring that 
citizens are able to overcome cognitive impediments to protecting 
themselves in crucial moments where time is of the essence. 
Seventh, this proposal is narrowly tailored in the sense that it is 
unlikely to have negative effects on other important rights enjoyed by 
citizens.  As discussed at the beginning of this Article, in the wake of 
several bigoted attacks, some have argued for clamping down on hate 
speech with the idea that it will reduce race-driven crimes.  The 
danger with such approaches, however, is that they may quickly result 
in a less democratic society.333  As Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld has 
summarized, “Those charged with enforcing the laws have sometimes 
overstepped the bounds of their authority—and have infringed upon 
First Amendment rights—when they have attempted to investigate or 
silence extremists.”334  With respect to implicit racial bias, regulators 
might clamp down on stereotypical depictions of African Americans 
as violent, aggressive, and criminal in movies, television programs, 
and advertising with the hope of debiasing the population,335 but such 
significant government intervention might come at a real cost to core 
values, like freedom of speech and the independence of journalists. 
Eighth, and finally, a training regime is likely to prove to be a far 
more efficient use of scarce resources to minimize race-based 
violence than alternatives.  Monitoring proposals, like the new Lone 
 
330 See, e.g., Plant & Peruche, supra note 216, at 182. 
331 See, e.g., Correll et al., supra note 137, at 1020. 
332 See, e.g., Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma, supra note 216, at 1325; 
Correll et al., supra note 137, at 1007; Plant et al., supra note 238, at 147. 
333 See Hickey, supra note 22. 
334 Gerstenfeld, supra note 119. 
335 See Kang, supra note 216, at 1572–89. 
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Wolf Initiative, aimed at tracking potential bigoted attackers, require 
much investment and promise little definite payoff.336  Similarly, hate 
crime prosecutions by the Department of Justice can have significant 
value, but they are also costly, time-consuming, controversial, and 
occur after the harm to a minority has already been perpetrated.337  
Required training for gun owners by contrast may prevent thousands 
of racially biased shootings with comparatively little government 
expenditure (in terms of public tax dollars spent per prevented harm). 
CONCLUSION 
A sighted shooter is probably more dangerous because they can see 
something scary and pull their gun in haste.338 
  – Carey McWilliams 
  A blind man who was granted 
  concealed weapons permits 
At a recent service in which he invited his congregation to bring 
their guns to church, Ken Pagano, pastor of the New Bethel Church in 
Louisville, Kentucky, told members, “There is nothing to be afraid of 
from a legal firearms owner.”339 
As this Article has investigated, Pastor Pagano’s words reflect and 
embody a powerful narrative in our country about rational shooters: it 
is written on our car bumpers, trumpeted by radio show hosts, and 
forms the bedrock beneath the Supreme Court’s approach in Heller 
and McDonald.  Yet, the best empirical evidence suggests that it is 
inaccurate.  There is something to be afraid of. 
On a basic level, what the implicit bias studies document is a quirk 
in our shooting behavior that results in bullets not going where we 
intend them.  It is not much different than if scientists discovered that 
most people had a tendency to flinch involuntarily when they used 
their guns, causing errant—and dangerous—trajectories.  In that 
scenario, it would be hard to argue against a state requiring gun 
owners to spend a few hours practicing so that they could learn to 
control for the twitch.  It would just seem like the sensible thing to do; 
gun owners could feel safer knowing that they were not going to miss 
 
336 Johnson, supra note 24; see also Gerstenfeld, supra note 119. 
337 See Urbina, supra note 24; Johnson, supra note 24. 
338 Kolpack, supra note 183. 
339 The Lede, A Congregation of the Armed and Faithful, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2009, 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/armed-and-faithful-count-down/?hp. 
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in a critical moment, and we could save the lives of all of those 
innocents who might otherwise be hit by errant bullets. 
This Article presents a similarly practical and politically acceptable 
approach to dealing with a known firearm safety hazard—a threat to 
minority citizens that is far graver than the risks of hate groups and 
hate crimes that have received so much recent attention by journalists, 
academics, and policy makers.  Whether we act to protect thousands 
of Americans will come down to our ability to reconsider what really 
animates human action. 
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APPENDIX A 
STATE CONCEAL AND CARRY REQUIREMENTS340 
 Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
Yes No license 
required 
 
No license 
required 
Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
May issue   Shall issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
No   No 
Requires training No   Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards341 
No   No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
No   Yes 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
No   Yes 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
No   No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
No   No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
$5.00-15.00   $144.25 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
One year   Five years 
 
340 All information in Appendix A was collected using state statutes and online 
resources.  A complete list of the implicated Web sites is available with the author.  In 
some cases local officials were called to confirm abmiguous information.  In addition, a 
number of cities also regulate firearms, but they have been left out of the chart for space 
reasons.  See, e.g., LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 181, at xv (“Chicago, 
Cleveland, Columbus, Hartford, New York City and Omaha generally do not allow 
carrying concealed weapons, but Hartford, New York City and Omaha have permitting 
schemes that would allow some concealed carry.”). 
341 The NRA offers a range of courses that are approved by states as meeting firearm 
safety course requirements.  See Course Catalog, supra note 267. 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 California Colorado Connecticut Delaware 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
May issue Shall issue May issue May issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
No No Yes No 
Requires training Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
Yes No No Yes 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
No No Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
No No No No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
$95.00 $152.50 $140.00 $35.00 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
Two years Five years Five years Two years 
 70 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 1 
APPENDIX A (continued) 
 Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
Shall issue Shall issue May issue Shall issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Requires training Yes No Yes Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
No No No No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
No No Yes No 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
No No No No 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
No No Yes No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
No No No No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
$117.00 $65.00 Varies by 
county 
$20.00 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
Seven years Five years One year Five years 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
No such 
licenses 
issued 
Yes Yes Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
 Shall issue May issue Shall issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
 Yes No No 
Requires training  Yes Yes Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
 No Yes No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
 Yes Yes No 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
 No Yes No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
 No No No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
 $45.00 Varies by 
county 
$150.00 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
 Four 
years/lifetime 
One year Four years 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
No Shall issue Shall issue May issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
No No Yes Yes 
Requires training Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
No No No No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
No No No No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
No No No No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
$60.00 $100.00 $35.00 $112.25 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
Five years Four years Four years One year 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
May issue Shall issue Shall issue Shall issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
Yes No Yes No 
Requires training Yes Yes Yes No 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
No No No No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
No Yes Yes No 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
No Yes Yes No 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
No No No No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
No No No No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
$100.00 $105.00 $75.00 $132.00 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
Five years Four years Five years Four years 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
Shall issue Shall issue Shall issue Shall issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
No No No Yes 
Requires training Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
No No No No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
No No No No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
No No No No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
$100.00 $60.00 $100.00 $100.00 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
Three years Four years Five years Five years 
 
 2010] Quick on the Draw 75 
APPENDIX A (continued) 
 New  
Hampshire 
New  
Jersey 
New 
Mexico 
New  
York 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
Shall issue May issue Shall issue May issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
Yes Yes No No 
Requires training No No Yes Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
No No Yes No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
No No Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
No No Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
No No No No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
No No No No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
$10.00 $20.00 $100.00 $150.00 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
Four years Two years Four years Lifetime 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 North  
Carolina 
North  
Dakota 
 
Ohio 
 
Oklahoma 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
Shall issue Shall issue Shall issue Shall issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
No Yes No No 
Requires training Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
No Yes No No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
No Yes No No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
No No No No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
$80.00 $45.00 $67.00 $200.00 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
Five years Three years Five years Ten years 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
  
Oregon 
 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode  
Island 
South  
Carolina 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
Shall issue Shall issue Shall issue Shall issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Requires training Yes No Yes Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
No No No No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
No No No No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
No No No No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
$65.00 $30.00 $40.00 $50.00 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
Three years Five years Four years Four years 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 South 
Dakota 
 
Tennessee 
 
Texas 
 
Utah 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
Shall issue Shall issue Shall issue Shall issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Requires training No Yes Yes Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
No No Yes No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
No No Yes No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
No No No No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
$10.00 $115.00 $100.00 $65.25 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
Four years Four years Four years Five years 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
  
Vermont 
 
Virginia 
 
Washington 
West 
Virginia 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
No license 
required 
Yes Yes Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
 Shall issue Shall issue Shall issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
 Yes Yes No 
Requires training  Yes Yes Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
 No No No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
 No No No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
 No No No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
 $50.00 $55.25 $90.00 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
 Five years Five years Five years 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 Wisconsin Wyoming 
Requires a permit or 
license to carry a 
concealed weapon 
No such 
licenses 
issued 
Yes 
May issue/shall 
issue 
 Shall issue 
Issues permits to 
nonresidents 
 No 
Requires training  Yes 
Training exceeds 
NRA standards 
 No 
Training requires 
live fire shooting 
practice 
 Yes 
Training requires a 
written firearm 
safety exam 
 Yes 
Training requires a 
performance firearm 
safety exam 
 No 
Training requires a 
“shoot/don’t shoot” 
simulation 
 No 
Cost of license or 
permit 
 $74.00 
Period for which 
license or permit is 
valid 
 Five years 
 
 
